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This research provides an analysis of the current maritime
security threat to the Baltic Approaches posed by Warsaw Pact
military expansion. Nordic regional security is discussed in
order to determine the importance of the region from both the
Warsaw Pact and NATO perspective. The role of Finnish and
Swedish neutrality as well as the roles of NATO and Warsaw
Pact allies are examined in terms of capability, resolve and
national interests. Denmark, as the geographic key to the
Baltic, is discussed in particular depth. As Soviet pressures
have increased in Danish territorial waters and airspace,
Denmark's support for NATO has been questioned. The
contribution of the Federal Republic of Germany, militarily
NATO's strongest Baltic ally, is also reviewed. The regional
balance in the Baltic has moved in favor of the Soviet led
Warsaw Pact. However, Soviet political and military pressure
has been relatively ineffective and even counterproductive to
date. Both Denmark and the FRG remain firmly entrenched in
NATO. Neutral Sweden has become even more firmly committed to
defend Swedish territory from Warsaw Pact encroachments.
Possible options are explored to enable NATO to shift the
regional balance in the direction of stable deterrence and
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Like a large red tongue, the zone of Soviet
influence extends far beyond Berlin into the
very center of Europe. If it ever greedily
licks out farther, all nations of Western
Europe will be threatened; ... the stronger
the flanks are made in the north and in the
south, and the more care is taken that the
Baltic becomes a NATO sea as soon as possible,
the safer will all..of the democracies be from
Soviet influence."
Commander T. Gerhard Bidlingmaier
Federal German Navy
September 1958
This thesis examines three basic questions concerning
the maritime security of the Baltic Approaches. First , in
the event of a major East-West war, how important to both
NATO and the WTO (Warsaw Treaty Organization) would control
of the Baltic Approaches be? Second , does NATO presently
possess the capability and political resolve to successfully
defend the approaches from a Warsaw Pact attack? Third ,
what consequences would NATO face should the approaches and
the Danish peninsula fall under Warsaw Pact control?
Part One of this thesis concerns Soviet interest and
influence in the Baltic. The military power that has
ceaselessly increased since the late sixties is discussed in
political and ideological terms as well as in terms of

operational considerations. A Soviet blend of ideology,
political persuasion and Realpolitik has produced a foreign
policy aimed directly at the Scandinavian countries and
designed to weaken NATO cohesion in the north.
After Soviet Baltic security interests, the contribu-
tions of the USSR's Baltic allies in Poland and East
Germany, as they pertain to the security of the Baltic
Approaches, are considered. Current Warsaw Pact naval
trends and exercises are discussed as well as the role
played by the neutral Baltic nations of Sweden and Finland.
Part Two examines NATO's position in the Baltic.
Denmark, as the gate keeper, is addressed in terms of
capability and political resolve. Considered by some to be
a weak link in the military alliance because of its failure
to participate in its own defense, on a level satisfactory
to other NATO partners, this country occupies a strategic
position for Baltic and North Sea security. It is the
bridge that connects central Europe with its northern
allies and, at the same time, the dam which can hold back a
Warsaw pact flood from spilling over into the North Sea.
The Federal Republic of Germany's contributions are then
assessed. The German naval role in supporting the Danish
fleet is vital to control of the straits as well as to the
security of the Central Front's northern flank.

After establishing the players and the tools available
to them, plausible maritime scenarios are analyzed. Much
can be learned from the evolution of Warsaw Pact exercises
in the Baltic. Each year some of the largest naval
amphibious exercises in the world take place in the Baltic
and connecting waters of the Northern Flank. It appears all
too clear that these exercises are merely a simulation of a
Warsaw Pact advance against the Danish and German coasts.
The threat confronting both these nations is real and
formidable in conventional and nuclear terms.
This thesis thus brings together evidence about the
changing strategic situation in the Baltic and concludes
with a brief discussion of possible options for NATO and its
Baltic allies.
A. BALTIC CONSTANTS
Any introduction to the problems of maritime security of
the Baltic Approaches must certainly consider the
"constants" as well as the "variables" that effect that
security. Constants are here defined as factors which man
has little or no control over and yet must contend with
daily. Geography is therefore one of the first things that
military planners consider when evaluating any region that
is a potential conflict area.
The geographic position of any sea in respect to its
latitude generally determines the type of climate prevailing
10

and the length of its days and nights. The Baltic lies
between latitude 54 N and 66 N. In January, nights range
from about 14 1/2 hours at the former latitude to about 18
hours at the latter. The long hours of darkness prevailing
in winter, coupled with short distance between the opposite
shores, provide very favorable conditions for the conduct of
naval operations, particularly for the side with inferior
airpower. Of course the opposite is true during the summer
when darkness is from one to five hours long and twilight
lasts the entire night. At 66°N the sun is continually
above the horizon. Thus in the summer, naval operations
would require reliable air cover because most of the
missions would take place during daylight hours.
The Baltic extends along the main north-south axis for
about 920 nautical miles (nm) and has an average width of a
little over 105nm. Sea distances between various points are
relatively short. For example, only 90nm separates Rostock
from Copenhagen (see Appendix A).
The small distances in the Baltic would permit a side
possessing air superiority to dominate a naval battle to a
far greater extent than would be the case on the open ocean.
The air threat alone severely restricts the employment of
major surface combatants such as cruisers and destroyers.
At the same time, the closeness of the area allows even the
weaker opponent to carry out surprise air and sea attacks
11

against enemy targets with a high probability of success.
The small distances in the Baltic significantly enhance the
possibilities of achieving tactical and even strategic
surprise in the conduct of naval operations. The short
distances permit the execution of offensive missions in
rapid succession, thereby making it very difficult for the
defender to recover from the blows of a previous strike.
Aside from the short distances, the Baltic Sea is
predominantly shallow, with about 60 percent of the total
area less than 165 feet deep. The deepest water, about 1500
feet, is found between the island of Gotland and Sweden's
port of Nykoping (see Appendix B) . The average depth of
water in the Great Belt is from 42 to 74 feet and in the
Sound from 52 to 123 feet.
"Water depth in a 'narrow' sea directly determines 1)
the size of ships and submarines to be employed, 2) the
ships' speed of advance, 3) the use of underwater weapons,
2
and 4) the effectiveness of ASW acoustic sensors."
However, this same shallow water makes the Baltic
particularly suited for mine warfare. All types of mines
can be effectively deployed in the Baltic.
Water depth, the closeness of the coast, and the
character of the sea bottom have a considerable effect on
underwater sound propagation. These factors limit the
effectiveness of sonar systems in underwater detection.
12

Water temperature and salinity changes tend to improve sonar
conditions in winter, but that is also the time when sea
states tend to be higher which can cancel any improvement.
The last geographic consideration to mention is the
weather. From October through March westerly and south-
westerly seas predominate in the Baltic. The frequent
passages of severe storms add to the roughness of the sea.
The high sea states, which predominate the fall and winter
months, influence the speed of surface ships, affect comfort
and cause crew fatigue. This is especially the case for
shallow draft Fast Patrol Boats (FPBs) and amphibious ships.
A conventional-hulled FPB becomes very difficult to operate
effectively in high sea states and speed is drastically
reduced to prevent structural damage.
In the Baltic visibility is poorest in winter and
spring, and best in summer and early fall. Fog is frequent
over open water from December through June. There is an
average of twenty days precipitation during December and
snow falls over the north Baltic an average of 40 to 50 days
a year.
Ice generally presents a significant obstacle to naviga-
tion in winter even in average years; but in severe winters
the entire region north of the sourthern tip of Gotland is
ice-encumbered. In the Gulf of Riga ice hinders navigation
for 60 to 120 days and stops it 30 to 80 days per year.
13

In contrast to war in the open ocean, a conflict in the
Baltic would force both sides to face each other more -
directly and thereby offer greater opportunities for
surprise, short, intense attacks and more frequent assaults
with less time to recover. The side with the weaker navy
would have great difficulty avoiding direct conflict with
the numerically superior force.
B. THE THREAT
After a brief look at the geographical constants which
effect Baltic security, it is necessary to look at one of
the most important variables. A variable may be defined as
one of those factors over which man has some control and
ability to change. The first and most significant variable
that must be considered is the form of the threat. The
security of the Baltic Approaches, like that of the rest of
Western Europe, is threatened by the expansion of Soviet
political and military power.
A common myth among many Western politicans implies that
NATO tends to over-estimate Soviet military power and fails
to consider the many weaknesses which plague the Warsaw
Pact. This myth has been encouraged by dangerous mispercep-
tions that gained credence during the last few years because




Americans and Europeans alike can remember the almost
universal failure of allied estimates of Nazi and Japanese
intentions in the World War II years. There were those who
accused the allies of inventing the threat in order to
justify defense buildups and war retoric.
The Soviets have never had a problem defining the threat
or who is to blame for the arms race that has resulted. The
paranoid function of inventing enemies has become one of the
not inconsiderable organizing principles of the Soviet state
and certainly the military. The Soviet press continually
tells the Soviet populace that they are surrounded by
imperialist enemies wishing to dominate and destroy the
Motherland. Wasn't it Western Imperialists who unleased the
Nazi hordes on Russia in World War II? Fear and panic about
war and enemies reinforce the intense Soviet campaign for
military readiness.
The ideology which calls for Russia to be prepared to
repel sudden attacks from the imperialist is equally useful
for encouraging the need for launching pre-emptive attacks
in order to prevent such an invasion.
Soviet leaders have reiterated on many occasions, that
the threat of war exists as long as imperialism exists.
Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky stated in 1963 in his first
edition of Military Strategy that: "The main source of the
military threat is the aggressive policy of American
15

imperialism, which reflects the desire of United States
capitalist monopolies for world domination." Many people
in the West have failed to comprehend this basic principle
of Soviet ideology. The Soviets hold that socialism and
capitalism are two dialectically opposed systems, and that
history will not permit a non-coercive solution to the
differences between those two systems. A fundamental tenet
of Leninism is that only through the destabili zation of the
world order as it exists can imperialism be overthrown. Any
future world war will be regarded by the Soviets as a
confrontation between two opposing world socio-economic
systems—socialist and capitalist. The objective will not
be only geographical but ideological as well.
Robert Bathurst expressed this view of modern Soviet
warfare: "Thus, the Soviet language of war does not begin
where the American does, with a breach of legality, or end
where it does with a military defeat. It begins with the
exacerbation of class warfare (which emerges often as the
warfare of political parties) and ends with nothing less
than the transformation of society. The last Soviet battle
does not take place when the missiles have ceased to fly,
but when the revolutionary executions against the wall have
stopped ."
Western foreign policy strives to maintain the stability
of the world in order to ensure peace. The West seeks to
15

maintain the status-quo. However, the communist dialectic
demands an unstable world that is susceptible to change.
The Soviets perceive internal stability to be a result of
external instability. Their foreign policy seeks to promote
a system of world instability in which anti-imperialist
struggles can be promoted. It appears evident that these
two policies of world order (or disorder) could well
eventually lead to conflicts on the ideological, political,
social and possibly even military levels.
The Soviet military buildup has been massive and relent-
less. For the past two decades, the Soviet military has
claimed twelve to thirteen percent of the Soviet Union's
Gross National Product and is growing at a rate of four to
five percent in real terms each year. This massive
dedication of resources has enabled the Soviet Union to
accelerate its production of new weapons systems and force
expansion, while the West has exercised restraint in the
atmosphere of detente.
In 1981, the Soviet Union made operational new SS-20
missile sites at a rate of six launchers per month, its
highest rate of deployment ever, thus adding over 200
warheads on launchers. The Soviets now have 351 launchers





In spite of statements to the contrary, The Soviet Union
continues to build up it's nuclear forces. Current esti-
mates indicate there are 630 SS-21s, 554 SS-22S, and 100
SS-12/22 land based surface-to-surface missile launchers in
Eastern Europe which if forward deployed, could reach deep
ginto Western Europe. Combining these missiles with the
nearly 380 SS-4 and SS-5 missiles still operational, they
effectively cover a range from about 100 km for the SS-21 to
about 4,000 km for the SS-5. Including SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5
missiles, the Soviet Union has about 1,300 longer-range land
9based INF missile warheads on operational launchers. NATO
has not modernized it's nuclear forces since the intro-
duction of the short range LANCE missile in the early 1970s.
In a conventional perspective, the Warsaw Pact intro-
1duced about 2000 T64/72 tanks into its inventory in 1981.
The Soviets also placed the T80 tank in trial production.
Allied Command Europe (ACE) fielded about a third that
number in modern tanks. In 1981, the Pact air forces added
about 1000 new aircraft, most having twice the range and
three times the payload of those replaced. ACE added less
than half that number of new aircraft. As for naval
forces, during that same period, the WTO launched an addi-
tional eight submarines (five nuclear-powered) and added
30 surface ships of various types to its operational force.
NATO nations roughly matched the Warsaw Pact in naval
18

construction, but NATO's maritime modernization programs
still lag behind the growing requirements of an ocean-
dependent alliance.
Although military figures do not reflect the complete
balance, the frequently heard arguments for the West's
healthier economies, democratic political systems and a more
open and equal alliance, do not translate into reductions of
the WTO ' s overall military strength. The Soviets have
created a military apparatus which has been able to dominate
life in the Warsaw Pact nations.
Many who argue that Soviet military power is exaggerated
also contend that current American security policy is
destabilizing and upsetting the world balance. It would be
more accurate, perhaps, to see U.S. policy today as a
reaction to the Soviet failure to exercise restraint during
the detente of the 1970s. Recent arms reduction
negotiations demonstrate that the Soviets see no security in
equality. In the Soviet view, security can only be assured
from a position of superiority. This attitude is intended
to make Western security untenable.
C. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Soviet security requirements, and the strategy followed
to achieve them, should not be unfamiliar to NATO. Soviet
military strategy remained relatively unchanged after World
War II and during the formation of NATO.
19

Immediately after the Federal Republic of Germany joined
NATO, the Warsaw Treaty Organization was formed in May 1955.
It is a multilateral military and political alliance between
the USSR and East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Rumania and Bulgaria (Albania withdrew in 1968) . The
backbone and major stockholder in the organization is the
Soviet Union. To strengthen the organization, bilateral
treaties of alliance and friendship have been signed between
each individual member nation and the USSR. The Soviets
have deployed troops in Poland, East Germany, Hungary and
Czechoslovakia under a status of forces agreement with the
host country.
Since the early 1950s, the Soviet Union has risen from a
position of nuclear inferiority to the United States, to one
of relative parity. Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact have
modified their strategies accordingly. NATO's 1950s policy
of massive retalization was credible from a position of U.S.
nuclear superiority but provided few options to defense
planners in an era of parity.
In 1967 NATO adopted the strategy of flexible response.
Flexible response emphasizes the concept of NATO's diverse
retaliatory options. The NATO triad is composed of strate-
gic nuclear forces, theatre nuclear forces, and conventional
forces. Unless the USSR preceded NATO in using nuclear
weapons, NATO would use nuclear weapons only if conventional
20

forces could not resolve the "crisis". NATO is not oriented
toward war-winning, but rather toward deterrence of conflict
and prompt crisis resolution, restoring the security and
integrity of the NATO area as rapidly as possible and with
as little violence as possible. The flexible response
concept assumes that NATO would have sufficient warning time
to mobilize before any conflict with the Warsaw Pact. The
strategy is intentionally clouded with ambiguity to allow
for liberal interpretation by the Alliance partners.
Because it does not rule out the possible first use of
nuclear weapons, it provides an incalculable risk factor for
Soviet planners.
Initially some European leaders (particularly in France)
saw flexible response as a decoupling of the U.S. from
Europe or at least a weakening of the U.S. nuclear
guarantee. In recent years, West Europeans have developed
increased respect for NATO policy, as a more realistic
response to Soviet military power than "massive retaliation"
of the 1950s.
In 1968, one year after NATO adopted flexible response,
Marshal V. D. Sokolovskiy published his third and last
edition of Military Strategy . This series became the
foundation of a new Soviet (and Warsaw Pact) strategy which
has remained relatively unchanged.
21

However, the continuing Soviet strategy that Sokolovskiy
authoritatively articulated in 1968 does not appear to fit
the basic NATO assumption of ample warning time. Soviet
strategy clearly emphasizes what it refers to as a signi-
ficant "pre-emptive strike". The Soviets prefer the term
pre-emptive because it implies their acting before NATO
"imperialists" can carry out alleged plans to strike first.
The Soviets do not want the moral opprobrium of publicly
planning a first strike, but they do say that they will
achieve surprise, seize the initiative, and pre-empt the
first strike plans they falsely attribute to NATO. The
strike is intended to be without warning, capitalizing on
the strategic use of nuclear weapons.
Soviet military strategy is oriented toward victory
rather than crisis management. Sokolovskiy put it in these
terms: "The military and political arms of a world war can
only be attained by the elimination of strategic weapons,
destruction of the enemy's economic base, defeat of his
armed forces in the theaters of military operation (land and
1
2
sea), and capture of his territory." The Soviets view
military power as the ultimate means for pursuing political
rends. Soviet diplomacy, and all other manifestations of
Soviet policy are intended to develop favorable circum-
stances for bringing this power to bear. The communication
of serious military intent contributes toward frightening
22

the West and allows for the use of military power on more
subtle levels—e.g., blackmail and creating situations" of
vulnerability for their opponents. Power, whether subtle or
blatant, is traditionally focused on the weakest point in
the enemy's defenses.
In the Baltic region, the maintenance and growth of
Soviet military power has been quite evident. Eastern
Europe and the Baltic States have continually felt the
pressure of Soviet military resolve. The increase in
Soviet military strength has four uses in Northern Europe:
1) overt Soviet aggression; 2) political influence without
the use of force; 3) exploitative political influence on a
case by case basis; and 4) political suppression of Soviet
satellites. The Soviets have threatened the first,
attempted the second, and have been active in the fourth.
American power and NATO cohesion may have been the elements
which blunted Soviet initiatives in the second and third
categories, but the relative decline of Western power in
recent years has created an opening for renewed Soviet
activity. However, a more serious threat than direct
military intervention in Scandinavia, may be the indirect
14danger of " Finlandi zation"
.
D. STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE
NATO strategies have divided ACE into three major
regions based on the dictates of geography: the Central
23

Front and the Northern and Southern Flanks. In the past,
the majority of NATO's resources and defenses have been
directed toward the Central Front, but increasingly the
Soviet military and political threat to the flanks appears
to pose even greater challenges. Soviet strategists
indicate that the concept of flank envelopment is still a
preferred tactic. Marshal of the Soviet Union, A. A.
Grechko , in his book of Soviet military doctrine, addressed
three basic types of recognized "operations", one of which
was encirclement. Primary to a successful military
offensive is "the encirclement and subsequent destruction of
the enemy by delivery of two main attacks in converging
directions, while at the same time shattering the enemy's
defenses and pushing one's own offensive deep into his
15
rear". Admittedly, this idea refers to World War II
battlefield tactics. However, on a larger scale the basic
forms of Soviet war fighting operations do not appear to
have been altered.
The Central Front and Northern Flank come together at
the Baltic Sea, control of which is necessary for main-
taining cohesion and contiguity in allied support of
Northern Europe and Western Europe as a whole. Geographic
vulnerabilities of this region may be seen by a glance at a
map. Scandinavian governments often appear weak and
ineffective because of multi-party systems and growing
24

conflicts between the financial claims of social welfare and
defense. Soviet efforts to perpetuate and aggravate these
weaknesses through political or military means, while
attempting to strengthen their own position and interests,
are analyzed in this thesis.
The Soviet Union meets the three requirements of a naval
power according to Mahan: a strong fleet, a strategically
adequate geographical position, and a maritime way of
thinking. This is especially true in the Baltic, where the
Warsaw Pact maintains a naval force five times that of the
NATO nations, and controls, either directly or through its
allies, over 60 percent of the coastline. For the mainte-
nance and supply of the Soviet navy, the Baltic is of great
importance. By far the largest naval repair facilities for
the Russian fleets are in Baltic ports, notably Leningrad.
The Baltic Sea drives a wedge deep into the industrial heart
of the Soviet Union. The Soviet naval bases in the Black
Sea and Pacific are of secondary importance for these
purposes. The Northern fleet facing the Artie, remains the
most substantial , as well as the least vulnerable
geographically
.
Vice Admiral Gerd Jeschonnek, a former Chief of Staff
for the Federal German Navy, discussed the naval warfare
potential of the Warsaw Pact in these terms:
25

"The Soviet naval warfare would be impaired consider-
ably if the Soviets failed to utilize the war
potential in the Baltic for the overall warfare.
Thus, the possession of the Baltic Approaches gains
in this conjunction importance for the allied warfare
all the more since the route from the Baltic bases to
the Arctic Ocean base via the Arctic Ocean Channel
can only be used during the ice-free season, and it
is easy to block. From statements of Soviet politi-
cians and measures of the Soviet Navy, it can be seen
that it is still the aim of Soviet politics, also to
achieve superiority in power in the Baltic area,
which would offer a wide range of possibilities for
negotiations to the Soviet leadership."
When NATO adopted flexible response, strategists in both
the East and West realized that strategic nuclear parity
would soon exist between NATO and Warsaw Pact. However,
military parity has never existed in the Baltic or the
Northern Flank since the close of World War II. The Baltic
is a region of considerable Warsaw Pact force superiority.
With several thousand tactical nuclear weapons behind
the Central Front lines, both sides must realize that a
confrontation in Germany would probably lead to the use of
nuclear weapons. Given its inferiority in conventional
forces, NATO would find it difficult to avoid the use of
nuclear weapons to stop the Red Army before it reached
Western nuclear depots. At West Germany's waist the
theater is only 130 miles wide. General Bernard W. Rogers,
the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe discussed the Central
Front in this way:
"Instead of possessing the variety of capabilities
which would truly translate into flexibility in
response, NATO is left in a posture that in reality
26

can only support a strategy more accurately labeled a
"delayed tripwire". The amount of delay following a-
conventional Warsaw Pact attack before the tripwire
would be activated and NATO would face resorting to
the nuclear option would depend on such variables as
length of warning time and the timeliness and
appropriateness of decision taken by political
authorities. Against large-scale conventional
aggression, even with adequate warning and timely
political decisions, our posture might at best be
sufficient to allow NATO only the time and security
necessary to deliberate and escalate to the use of
nuclear weapons."
Such danger is not present in the north. Even if
implementation of NATO's two track decision leads to initial
deployments of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Western
Europe in December 1983, the northern flank will remain a
voluntary nuclear-free zone. Because of this lack of a U.S.
nuclear presence, Soviet planners may doubt whether a
nuclear response to a conventional attack in the north would
be likely.
To a greater degree than ever before, the Baltic has
become a Russian lake, with the Soviet-dominated coastline
now lengthened from 75 miles in 1939 to nearly 1000 miles
today. The expanded coastline includes numerous commercial
ports and naval bases, some of them, those in the south and
west, normally ice-free. Even so, the Soviet geographical
situation is still basically less favorable than was
Germany's during World War II. Germany at least has a
coastline directly on the North Sea.
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The Danish peninsula of Jutland breaks the otherwise
unhindered European coastline from Leningrad to the channel
ports. Jutland is not only an obstacle to coastline traffic
along Europe's north shore, but also a gangway to Central
Europe. It is a relatively narrow finger denying the merger
of the North Sea and Baltic. Behind Jutland, the Germans
used the Baltic for supplying the armies on the Eastern
front during World War II. Today, the Baltic still serves
as a major supply route for the Soviet Union's forces in
Eastern Europe.
With such a large naval force in the Baltic, the WTO may
well aim at two major strategic objectives in a conflict
with NATO: 1) the seizure of Danish and North German
territory by amphibious and airborne assaults; and 2)
control of the Baltic Approaches and the sea areas that
connect Central Europe with North America.
It is apparent that a seizure of the Danish islands is a
prerequisite for gaining control of the Baltic Approaches.
The number of landing ships and amphibious assault craft
maintained in the Baltic by the littoral Warsaw Pact
countries is significant. Of these countries, none has
islands that might necessitate the use of amphibious ships
for defensive purposes. The nature of Warsaw Pact exercises
and the size and shape of their amphibious forces show that
they are specifically designed for offensive operations.
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Nor are their landing ships of such a type as to suggest a
more far-reaching concept of operations. The reactivation
of the Soviet Naval Infantry in 1963 was a reflection of the
renewed Soviet interest in amphibious operations.
NATO's control of the Baltic also hinges on control of
the Baltic Approaches. If the West is to successfully
bottle up the Soviet Baltic Fleet and prevent access to
Baltic shipyards by Northern Fleet ships, it must control
the straits. With a numerically inferior force, NATO will
rely heavily on mine warfare to accomplish this task.
The laying of effective defensive minefields with
sophisticated mines is much easier than their clearance.
The 1972 American aerial mining of North Vietnamese ports
during the Vietnam War provides a clear example of this
point. Though minefields were in place in a matter of
hours, it took several months with sophisticated mine-
counter-measures (MCM) equipment to clear the nearly 8000
mines utilized during the 9 month blockade.
The past blocking of the Danish Straits in the two World
Wars, and the present art of mine warfare are both well
known to the Soviets. They have extensive mine warfare
capability and experience. However, to force their way
through the Danish Straits once allied mines are in place,
if it were at all possible, would be a very costly and
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demanding job. NATO's success appears to depend on warning
time and the political resolve to use it.
In addition to the military capabilities of the Warsaw
Pact forces in the Baltic, the Kremlin has a powerful and
versatile instrument capable of exploiting indirect
strategic opportunities through political blackmail or for
the purpose of denying parts of the open sea to other
countries. In the Baltic, the Soviets have achieved a fair
amount of success in the latter.
The Baltic is a bottle with only one way in or out. As
long ago as 1908, the British made the decision not to send
major warships into the Baltic if war broke out with
Germany. Consequently, only a few British submarines
entered the Baltic Sea in World War I. No ships from
non-Baltic nations operated in the Baltic during World War
II primarily because of mines in the Danish Straits. Even
today, on the infrequent occasions that NATO's STANAVFORLANT
ships enter the Baltic Sea, they confine their cruising to
the very western portion. Both the Canadian and Dutch
governments have questioned the necessity of their ships
operating in the Baltic. Few and rare are the occasions
when NATO navies, other than Danish and German, ply Baltic
waters
.
Allied unwillingness to deploy non-Baltic nation ships
in the Baltic, presents both Denmark and Germany with a
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unique security problem. Far behind the Iron Curtain, even
further east than Berlin, lies the Danish island of
Bornholm. Here the build-up of the Warsaw Pact landing
forces is very seriously felt. Through Bornholm plays only
a minor role in controlling the straits, it has been
suggested that, since only Danish military forces are based
there, the Soviet Union might be tempted to attack the
island in order to test NATO's resolve in a period of
crisis
.
If the Soviets wished to bring their seapower to bear in
Central Europe, without actually crossing the Central Front,
they could conduct a limited strike on the German island of
Fehmarn. From Fehmarn, the sea passages from the Central
Baltic to Kiel Bay and the shores of Schleswig-Holstein and
Jutland could be controlled as well as the southern entrance
to the Great Belt, the most navigable of the three Danish
Straits (see Appendix A)
.
Apart from such a test, it is difficult to envisage a
situation in which an attack upon Danish or German territory
would not involve forces under NATO's Central European
command. Any further Warsaw Pact operation against NATO
would have to plan for complete seizure of the Baltic
Approaches, as Germany did in World War II. Control of the




Often it is pointed oat that in the strategy of both
NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the North Sea and Baltic Sea
constitute an integral whole. Whereas the Baltic serves as
a Soviet artery of supplies to the Central Front, the North
Sea has a similar function for NATO.
Since 1966, when France militarily pulled out of NATO,
the major U.S. supply line runs through Bremerhaven on the
German North Sea coast. The responsibility for providing a
continuous flow of supplies to the Central Front via
Bremerhaven and other ports such as Rotterdam and Antwerp
rests with the allied navies (see Appendix C) . The key to
the security of these sea lanes once again rests on the
Jutland peninsula. Depending upon who controls this
strategic piece of land, it becomes "a defender's bulwark or
1
8
an attacker's pedestal." Either side could use it as a
defensive area from which fighter-bomber aircraft could
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II. SOVIET INTEREST AND INFLUENCE IN THE BALTIC
In 1709, when Peter the Great defeated the Swedish
forces of Charles XII at the Battle of Poltava, Russia
secured its window to the West. Since that time, though
other Russian objectives have changed, their interest in the
Baltic Sea has never faltered and has gradually increased.
Prior to the Great Patriotic War (World War II) , the Soviets
controlled only a small portion of Baltic Sea coastline
around Leningrad. In the 1920s and 1930s, Soviet diplomacy
sought to increase its influence and establish some sort of
control over the Danish Straits. During the war and in the
post-war period, Stalinist diplomacy continued to expand
Soviet influence over coastal territories in the Baltic.
This included gaining a legal foothold over the Danish
2Straits through an internationally recognized agreement.
The Soviets learned to appreciate the advantages that
could be gained by expanding their boundaries and increasing
state security through the use of seapower. It was the
defense of their small foothold on the Baltic that became
the Soviet geopolitical justification for the acquisition of
the Baltic States as well as territory from Germany, Poland,
and Finland. With control over the present coastlines of
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East Germany (GDR) and Poland, the Baltic Sea is squeezed by
the grasp of Soviet influence.
The Baltic Sea represents the most efficient supply
route for the Russians. The Soviet Union depends on Baltic
Sea transportation for COMECON, East-West and third world
trade. It is through Baltic ports that the USSR receives
many of its vital imports. Warsaw Pact shipping contributes
between 10,000 and 15,000 passages through the Danish
Straits per year, or one-sixth of the total number of
passages. in 1968, there were over 73,000 passages of
merchant vessels and 7,000 fishing vessels from Warsaw Pact
countries. Forty to fifty percent of the Soviet merchant
marine is registered at Baltic ports, and more than 25
percent of the fishing fleet operates from the Baltic Sea.
An average of 400 passages of Warsaw Pact naval units takes
place each year.
The oldest of the Russian fleets and a powerful arm of
Soviet maritime capability remains enclosed in the Baltic
Sea. The present composition of the Soviet Twice Red Banner
Baltic Sea Fleet is designed primarily to ensure control of
Baltic waters, coastal defense and support offensive
amphibious operations in the Baltic region. However, in any
protracted conventional war scenario in which ships of both
sides must expect to suffer heavy damage in the initial
exchanges, units of the supremely important Northern Fleet
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will require access to the repair yards of the Baltic.
Along the Russian, Polish and East German Baltic coast is
located more than half of the Warsaw Pact ship-building and
repair capacity. In addition, the Baltic points to
Leningrad, the second largest industrial center in the
Soviet Union and the home of most naval training schools.
The Baltic Sea's potential role as either an avenue of
attack or one of resupply and forward stationing makes the
region sensitive for both the Soviet Union and NATO.
It was the Baltic Sea's geographic vulnerability,
demonstrated in both World War I and World War II, that
resulted in the Soviet decision to center the largest and
most important element of the Soviet Navy on the Kola
Peninsula. It is only through the Barents Sea that the
Soviet Navy can enter a major ocean without high risk of
detection. However, modern Soviet naval exercises still
demonstrate the desire to control the Baltic Approaches and
allow for the merging of the Baltic and Northern Fleets in
order to sever Norway from NATO while at the same time
protecting the Soviet flank and providing a location for
possible forward basing of Soviet naval aircraft (SNA) to
disrupt NATO SLOCs. The Soviets prefer to view the Danish
Peninsula as a forward defense line but realize that they
would have to dominate the Baltic in the early stages of any
conflict to accomplish this. Such aggression would be met
by the combined strength of NATO.
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Another alternative available to the Soviets is the
removal of the political will of Baltic nations, a
"Finlandization" of their national policies. The Soviets
see their best defense in the seizure of the tactical
advantage in whatever direction that may lie and through
whatever means is available. Neutrality and Nordic
fragmentation (rather than Nordic unification) are thus
beneficial to the USSR.
A. SOVIET POLITICAL THREAT
The tensions of the fifties and sixties caused by such
events as the Soviet suppression of the freedom fighters in
Hungary, the Berlin Crisis (culminating in the walling off
of the East Sector) and the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia were tranquilized by Soviet overtures toward
detente in the 1970s. The spirit of Helsinki (Final Act of
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1975)
and the peace-loving protestations of the 25th Congress of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1976, were two of
the detente initiatives aimed at Scandinavia.
Fortunately for NATO, the Soviet Union's foreign policy
occasionally undermines their own efforts toward pacifica-
tion and cause suspicions to persist. The 1979 invasion of
Afghanistan ended East/West detente as far as the United
States was concerned (although U.S. rhetoric still professes
interest in a "genuine" detente). However, it was the
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violation of Swedish territory by the October 1981 grounding
of a Soviet submarine U-137 near Karlskrona Naval Base, that
caused an even greater alarm in Scandinavia. The "Whiskey
on the Rocks" incident infuriated the Swedes, but the
apparent discovery of 22 pounds of uranium 238 aboard the
sub, on either nuclear torpedoes or mines, made Soviet
detente less palatable and reawakened Nordic leaders to
Soviet intentions.
Still, detente is alive and well in Western Europe and
Scandinavia is no exception. The Soviet political assault
has been twofold: use and abuse of the so-called "Nordic
Balance" and efforts to make the Baltic a closed sea. Both
efforts are backed by the development, exercise and threat
of overwhelming military might in a thinly veiled scheme of
military blackmail.
Steady diplomatic and political pressure is being
applied in the Soviet push for a nuclear-free zone (NFZ)
.
The growth of anti-nuclear sentiments has added new impetus
and urgency to an old subject and the Soviet Union is taking
full advantage of public pressure.
They have long been extremely interested in keeping
Western nuclear forces out of the Baltic. The threat of
American strategic bombers and aircraft carriers caused
Stalin to take various counter-measures in order to prevent
foreign ships and aircraft from getting close to the shores
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of Russia. Among them was the Soviet's unilateral extension
of what they claimed as territorial waters from the
traditional three miles allowed by international law to a
useful twelve miles. In the Baltic, the Soviets enforced
these limits rigorously; and Danish and Swedish fishing
boats that transgressed these new limits (sometimes
questionably) were promptly seized. In the same vein,
Stalin also ordered the shooting down of Swedish and
American aircraft that were accused of penetrating Soviet
national airspace. It was clear that Stalin wanted to show
the West in a clear and brutal manner the dangers inherent
in foreign aircraft flying around the east end of the Baltic
or Barents Seas.
The view of the Soviet Government, during the Khrushchev
era was that the neutrality of Swedish foreign policy, the
observance by Finland of Articles One and Two of the 1948
Treaty, and the demilitarization of Norway's northern
islands of Svalbard, provided reasonable safety for Russia's
northern flank. In 1956 the Soviet Government officially
accepted the validity of the Swedish policy of military non-
al ignment
.
At the same time the USSR sought to increase the
military advantages it derives from the neutralization of
this area. In 1957, Bulganin tried to persuade Denmark that
it should leave NATO and become neutral; while in 1964
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Khrushchev, during a visit to Sweden, commended the Swedish
plan of the time for a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe
(In the early 1960s, the USSR, given its nuclear inferiority
to the United States, was much in favor of nuclear-free
zones everywhere)
.
A NFZ in Scandinavia, by agreement of the regional
nations would be one more step closer to making the Baltic.
into a "closed sea". The Soviets have devised three
different categories of seas: internal, closed, and open
seas. Internal seas are those that are surrounded by the
territory of a single state and are consequently subject to
the jurisdiction of only that state. Closed seas , which are
surrounded by the territories of at least two states, have
only limited access to the open sea. The jurisdiction of
the closed seas is the concern of the littoral state
exclusively. The Baltic Sea belongs to this group, in the
Soviet view. The open seas are all those not included in
the first two groups.
The Soviet view accepts that merchant ships from non-
littoral states have a right of passage through straits to
closed seas, but this right is denied to warships from non-
littoral states. This would effectively deny U.S. warships,
as well as land or sea based nuclear weapons, from the
Baltic. This view is contrary to current international law.
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The Soviets clarified their position on a Baltic
nuclear-free zone as far back as 1959 in Izvestia (14 August
1959) :
"The establishment of a nuclear and missile free zone
in the North would become the first stage in the
transition of all the Nordic countries to a neutral
status... The Soviet Union, together with the other
great powers, would be prepared to respect the
neutrality of the Nordic countries, their territorial
integrity and independence without interfering in
their domestic affairs."
6They again made NFZ proposals in 1963 and 1973.
The Kekkonen Plan, introduced by then Finnish President
Urho Kekkonen in May 1978, was also a Kremlin-orchestrated
proposal. Underlying the plan was the assumption that the
so called Nordic Balance was not a static pattern but a
continuing balancing act between different interests. This
plan was also rejected, not only by NATO allies but also by
neutral Sweden. If actualized, the plan would have had
negative impact, as it would have limited NATO options in
the North. However, the Finnish plan actually served as a
confidence building measure which strengthened the balancing
factors in the region and solidified Finland's unique
position as a proponent of Soviet Baltic policy.
To date the question of NFZ remains unresolved, in part
because of Soviet unwillingness to consider Baltic portions
of the USSR as nuclear free. Without such equal pledges,
the North would be subject to nuclear blackmail. However,
if the credibility of American resolve to use nuclear
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weapons to defend NATO territory becomes increasingly
suspect, and NATO's conventional forces fall farther and
farther behind those of the Warsaw Pact, this arrangement
may appear more attractive to vulnerable West Europeans.
In 1965, Sweden announced its decision not to build
nuclear weapons and both Norway and Denmark have elected not
to allow the introduction of nuclear weapons on their soil.
In effect, a one sided NFZ exists without a formal
agreement
.
Closely aligned with the idea of a NFZ is the
Scandinavian political concept of the Nordic Balance. The
Nordic Balance is a political spectrum of East-West
orientation based on geographic proximity to the USSR and
the outcome of World War II. The Balance spectrum exists as
follows: Finnish neutrality and Eastern orientation based
on the 1948 Defense Pact with Russia; Swedish neutrality;
Norwegian and Danish NATO membership with reservations on
basing and stockpiling NATO men and material on Norwegian
7
and Danish soil. The Nordic Balance according to the West,
is supposed to reflect a subsystem of the overall European
balance of power. It is supposed to be self-regulating;
i.e., in 1961 the Soviets sought to invoke the 1948 Defense
Pact with Finland by demanding radar bases on Finnish soil;
the crisis was resolved when Norway threatened to permit




the demand restored the Nordic Balance. The Nordic Balance
can be summed up as follows:
"Nordic Balance is a theory of regional equilibrium
maintained by the Nordic nations between the major
power blocs of NATO vis-a-vis the Warsaw pact by
reasons of geography, political, military, and
economic factors, and most importantly, by the roles
of the Nordic countries themselves.
Troubled economic conditions have caused Scandinavia to
turn to the East in search of new markets. Closer trade
relations can result in stronger economies but also in
greater interdependence. For the Soviet Union, trade
fulfills three functions: 1) augmentation of the domestic
economy; 2) expansion of political influence abroad; and
3) access to foreign technology.
"In foreign economic relations are intertwined
politics and economics, diplomacy and commerce,
industrial production and trade."
"We regard foreign economic relations as an effective
means helping to carry out political and economic
tasks." 11
What is significant about Soviet trade relations in
today's era of European detente, when Russian resources are
increasingly in demand and Soviet manufacturing is
essentially self-sufficient, is the dependency it can create
on the part of its trading partners.
Finland is the most obvious example of this. After
signing the peace treaty with the USSR in 1947, the Soviets
got a captive industrial complex and a virtual monopoly
over exported resources. Since the Soviet Union set the
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specifications for manufactured items to satisfy war
reparations, today it has guaranteed supplies from Finland,
long after the fulfillment of the treaty. Until the recent
completion of three nuclear power plants, Finland was
totally dependent on the USSR for its energy requirements;
even now 70 percent of its crude oil comes from the Soviet
Union. Finland's dependence upon imports from Communist
countries doubled from 1973 to 1974, and the preponderance
of these imports came from the USSR. In 1975, when many
Western economies were suffering from the effects of
inflation, Finland managed to almost double its exports to
12its Communist trading partners.
There is an economic advantage wielded by the USSR and
other Communist states over their capitalist rivals. The
State-run economic systems can expand or contract their
trade at will, if only to the detriment of their laboring
populations, to accommodate the foreign policy of their
governments. This tends to make them attractive trading
partners in hard economic times. Thus far, Finland is the
exception in Scandinavian trade policies, but it provides an
illustration of the advantage of Communist trading partners
and the changes inherent when trade becomes a political
weapon
.
The strength of the Scandinavian Communist parties
varies from country to country. In Finland, where they are
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proportionally larger than elsewhere in Scandinavia, they
still hold less than a quarter of the seats in the Finnish
parliament. The Scandinavian Communist parties are divided
and vary in their loyalty to Moscow. However, they do
provide Moscow with a valuable tool that can be manipulated
quickly to exploit weaknesses and stir up trouble for
Western policies. An example of this seems to be in the
Communist party influence in the nuclear freeze movement.
The more serious threat does not appear to be from the
continued growth or power of these parties but instead, from
the political ideology they propose and the ability of
Moscow to use them as a political and economic lever.
As mentioned earlier, a real political threat is the
political apathy—or, more precisely, the feeling of
helplessness and vulnerability— that seems to run hand-in-
hand with Finlandization . If Scandinavian governments
arrive at the conclusion that they can do nothing to counter
Soviet power, Nordic security is in danger. Typical of that
position was a somewhat sarcastic proposal by Mogens
Glistrup, leader of the Danish Progress Party in 1977, when
he recommended that Denmark's defense apparatus be abolished
and replaced by an automatic telephone service to Moscow
1 3that would say "we surrender" in Russian.
8. THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT
History has repeatedly demonstrated the vulnerability of
the Baltic region. The German conquest of the Baltic states
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in World War I and II, the Soviet naval defeat by Germany in
the Baltic, Finnish alliance with Germany and subsequent war
with the Soviet Union are a few examples. Soviet naval
weakness in the face of superior naval power able to project
force against the Soviet periphery was the basis of Admiral
Gorshkov's February 1963 statement that encouraged the USSR
to build a navy sufficient for sea denial/interdiction, to
prevent the threatening U.S. Navy from projecting seaborne
aviation and SLBMs against the Soviet homeland. Defense in
the Baltic means defense of the Northern Soviet Union,
particularly Leningrad.
Soviet capability and intentions are manifest in both
visible force levels and actual exercises. The ships from
the Baltic and Northern Fleets joined together in the
Norwegian Sea during a coordinated exercise called "SEVER
1968" and again in the famous "OKEAN" exercises of April
1970 and 1975. The Baltic Fleets' role in "OKEAN 70" was to
provide flank cover for the Northern Fleet by steaming
through the Danish Straits into the North Sea, up the
Norwegian coast and around the North Cape. It was a plan
uncomfortably similar to the German invasion plan of Norway
14in 1940. "OKEAN 75" introduced amphibious assault
exercises for the first time in the Bay of Lubeck, which
signalled a seaborne assault capability against Denmark.
This exercise also demonstrated Soviet sea denial potential
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by deploying attack submarines to the Norwegian Sea along
the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap. Again in
1976 there was a joint exercise in the Baltic of Soviet,
Polish and East German forces, which again displayed
amphibious and ASW capabilities.
The Danish Seidenfaden Report on National Security of
September 1970, listed Soviet military denial goals with
respect to Denmark and the approaches as follows: 1) limit
free passage to and from the Baltic; 2) limit passage to
Soviet vessels; 3) serve as a springboard for operations in
southern Sweden and Norway, or against NATO naval forces in
the North Sea; 4) limit penetration and interdiction over
Soviet territory." Denmark, flanking the strategic straits
of the Kattegat and Skagerrak, as well as controlling the
still narrower straits leading to the Kattegat, presents a
NATO choke point for the Soviet Baltic Fleet. Control of
the straits changes the value of the Baltic Sea. The Soviet
interests in the Danish Straits are a function of the
expectation of the importance of the straits in a military
conflict with NATO.
Because of its composition, compared with the three
other Soviet fleets, the Baltic Fleet must be assumed to
have relevance primarily on the conventional level (see
Appendix P) . However, it seems probable that at least a
part of the Soviet navy's North Sea and Atlantic task force
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will come from the Baltic- . Behavior in exercises during the
last decade confirms this.
The presence of Soviet Golf-2 submarines in the Baltic
has brought a new capability to the region. Six Golf-2s
were transferred to the Baltic Sea from the Northern Fleet
in the fall of 1976. The submarines were built from 1958 to
1962 and were the first Soviet subs to carry ballistic
16
missiles with a range up to 600 nautical miles. This
directs an even greater number of nuclear weapons at Western
Europe. The Golf's missiles were not counted in the SALT-1
agreement on limitations of offensive weapons, due to their
relatively old age and short range. Since the USSR already
has considerable land based intermediate range missile
capability, they are not very significant in the theater
nuclear balance. However, in the minds of Nordic defense
planners, the Golf submarine represents one additional
threat to their security that must be considered.
Overall maritime superiority of the Warsaw Pact coun-
tries in the Baltic is estimated at five to one. What is
most disconcerting to Europe is that the Soviet Baltic Fleet
is much stronger than NATO opposition warrants, even if
Swedish naval forces were added to NATO.
In order to provide against a closing of the straits by
the NATO powers, the Soviet Union would have to control the
Danish isles, the peninsula of Jutland, and probably the
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southern part of Norway. Should the Soviets consider
control of the Baltic Approaches desirable, they have at
their disposal Soviet, Polish, and East German units
specially trained to support such an operation. In the
Baltic there is one Soviet and one Polish marine division
especially trained for amphibious operations. In addition,
East Germany maintains a mobile rifle division also
similarly trained. This brings the Warsaw Pact's force to
over 10,000 amphibious trained troops. Warsaw Pact
amphibious ship capacity includes approximately 80 Soviet,
23 Polish, and eighteen East German landing craft able to
land over 5,000 troops at one time. To this should be added
a significant number of role on-role off merchant ships
capable of follow-up operations. In addition, both the
Soviet Union and Poland maintain considerable airborne
forces in the Baltic.
The use of Naval Infantry for amphibious assault
represents a profound operational change for Soviet troop
employment. The Naval Infantry has been of little
significance in previous wars and was reportedly disbanded
in 1947. However, the reappraisal of Soviet force structure
in the early 1960s resulted in their re-institution. This
change in offensive structure demonstrates the Soviet
attitude that amphibious assaults will play a major role in
any future Baltic conflict.
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The Soviet Baltic Sea Brigade can be expected to attempt
to secure Baltic exits through Denmark and the strategically
placed island of Bornholm (see Appendix B) . In this
operation, they are likely to be assisted by Polish and East
German naval forces. Past Warsaw Pact exercises seem to
indicate that this is a primary mission of Warsaw pact
Baltic naval and air forces. The Soviets would want to
prevent any allied attempt to mine the Danish Straits or
impede the movement of Soviet ships and amphibious forces.
The territory in the vicinity of the Baltic Sea exits would
likely be immediately seized in order to facilitate an
eventual linkup of the Northern and Baltic Fleets in the
Skagerrak north of Jutland.
NATO seems to envision the Danish Straits as easily
closed to Warsaw Pact warships during hostilities. Present
transit restrictions provide valuable warning to give away
any unusual peacetime deployment of Warsaw Pact vessels that
may be in preparation of war (see Appendix D) . This warning
is a necessary part of NATO's flexible response strategy.
Although NATO controls the strategic narrows, it has
relatively little military power to counter a Warsaw pact
invasion of Denmark and, what is more important, to present
a credible conventional deterrent. The collective forces of
the Baltic Approaches Command (COMBALTAP) are estimated to
be outnumbered by about ten to one. Should Baltic defenses
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fail to repel a Warsaw Pact advance, sea communications with
Norway and the North Cape could be cut effectively
collapsing the European northern flank and greatly
17increasing the threat to Britain and Central Europe.
General Kurt Ramberg, Danish Chief of Staff in 1971,
gave a sober assessment of Denmark's blocking position:
"Denmark would not be able to defend against even the
first wave of a conventional attack. Allied rein-
forcements, therefore, would not have time to come to
Denmark's aid before the country was overrun by the
enemy.
"
In the 1970s, Warsaw Pact air and naval activity
pushed slowly but deliberately westward. It included
Soviet patrols in the Skagerrak, 30 to 40 Warsaw Pact
circumnavigations per year of the large Danish island of
Zealand, MIG-21 and MIG-25 patrols down to the East German
island of Rugen, also used for amphibious exercises, and
flights around the Danish island of Bornholm. One exercise
included a bomber run, south of Bornholm, during which up to
40 Warsaw Pact bombers at a time aimed for Southern Denmark
wheeling at the last minute off Rugen Island in East
19Germany.
Danish authorities have stepped up their radar surveil-
lance of the Baltic from Bornholm and expressed their
anxieties to NATO headquarters, claiming that Warsaw Pact
activities in the area are now of such proportions that it
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is difficult to distinguish between an exercise and what
might be an actual attack.
Denmark believes that the Baltic Sea begins around
Malmo, Sweden, close to Copenhagan. But the Soviet Union
believes the Baltic starts much further to the northwest
around southern Norway. This Soviet view could make Danish
defense of the Baltic Approaches incredibly difficult if the
Soviets enforced this view by deploying military resources
to attain their strategic objectives.
The Baltic-White Sea Canal, built by political prisoners
in the 1930s and recently modernized, facilitates transfer
of submarines, destroyers, and frigates with a displacement
20
of up to 5200 tons between the Baltic and Northern Fleets.
Having thus linked a main operational base with a major
repair and construction facility improves Soviet flexibility
in the Baltic.
The Baltic Sea Fleet has the largest number of naval
aviation bombers and fighters of the four Soviet fleets.
It controls an estimated 300 aircraft, including helicopters
in the various naval air forces. To support land amphibious
operations, more than 700 offensive aircraft are in East
Germany, Poland and the Western Military Districts of the
Soviet Union. In keeping with the combined arms strategy,
the total number of WTO combat aircraft facing European NATO
21is 7240. Of course not all of these aircraft would be
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used in the Baltic, but the number provides some insight
into the resources available to Soviet military planners
(see Appendix E)
.
Most significant among these aircraft is the Soviet long
range Backfire bomber. Based in East Germany, the Soviet
Baltic States, as well as in the western parts of the USSR,
these aircraft can easily reach NATO forces and supplies in
the Baltic and North Sea. The Backfire bombers* unrefueled
combat radius with a five ton bomb load has been estimated
22
at 3,074 nautical miles. This range allows for inter-
diction of NATO supply lines as far away as the mid-
Atlantic
.
Particularly well suited for supporting an assault on
the straits is the attack helicopter. Afghanistan has
provided a good example of the capabilities of the MI-24
HIND and MI-8 HIP. These helicopters could easily be
positioned to participate in the Baltic. They provide
immediate aerial fire support to ground forces and support
airmobile operations. For example, the MI-24 HIND can
transport a fully armed squad of troops (eight men) and
remain over the fire zone while providing direct fire
support with its anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and 24mm
cannon
.
The overall Warsaw Pact advantage in aircraft, readily
23
available in the Baltic, is estimated at three to one.
55

For Denmark, as the primary defender of the Baltic
Approaches, this air threat is very real. Aircraft
attacking Denmark from the southeast, at subsonic speeds,
could be over Danish targets in two minutes. Additionally,
along with the rest of Europe, Denmark is vulnerable to
Soviet SS-4, SS-5, SS-20, and SS-22 intermediate range
missiles
.
As for land forces, fourteen Warsaw Pact divisions
(seven of which are tank divisions with about 9000 men each)
and including one airborne division, are deployed in the
northern part of East Germany and Poland. Over half of
these units would likely be used for an assault on the
Baltic Approaches. Another seven divisions from the Western
Military Districts of the USSR could also be used in the
Baltic on short notice. The major elements of motorized
rifle divisions are equipped with amphibious tracked and
wheeled armored personnel carriers (APC) and up to 250
tanks. The tank divisions each have approximately 330
tanks. The Warsaw Pact advantage in tanks is estimated at
24three to one.
A Soviet attack under the guise of a major maritime
exercise could move forces into position and completely
isolate Norway and the Danish Straits before NATO could
respond. NATO's decision-making process during a time of
such tension or anticipated attack would have to be
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considerably streamlined in order to neutralize the Soviet
numerical advantage. This timing is particularly crucial in
the Baltic because of the short distanced involved. Delayed
decisions to mine the Danish Straits could result in a
Soviet naval presence which would make NATO mining
operations extremely hazardous. This naval presence would
leave the Soviet Fleet unimpeded freedom to complete the
encirclement of Sweden, Norway and Finland. The time factor
applies equally to decisions concerning deployment of
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III. WARSAW PACT BALTIC MARITIME PARTNERS
The largest non-Soviet navy in the Warsaw Pact belongs
to Poland; when combined with the naval forces of the GDR,
the Poles provide a significant naval resource capable of
supporting Soviet defensive and offensive requirements in
the Baltic. However, in order to best understand their
contribution, it is important to place the role of non-
Soviet navies in proper perspective. The non-Soviet navies
of the Warsaw Pact have important missions, but they do not
bear the responsibility of the Pact's success or failure in
the Baltic, nor do they act as vital instruments of
peacetime policy. Both the Polish and East German navies
are peripheral forces and part of an alliance that is
dominated by a great continental and intercontinental
nuclear superpower. Only the Soviet Navy has any global
pretensions, which are unrelated to the missions of the
other navies of the Warsaw Pact.
East German and Polish military doctrine and forces
cannot be intelligently discussed separately from the domes-
tic and foreign socio-political and economic considerations.
Further, the East German and Polish navies cannot be sensi-




The Soviet view of peace is as important to consider as
the Soviet view of war. Poland and East Germany are attuned
to political as well as military realities. The USSR has
been attentive to the need for the Pact to serve not only as
a politically integrating instrument in peacetime but also
as a viable and fully integrated body capable of providing a
modern conventional military force. A military alliance,
dominated by Soviet power, is a necessity for political
control of Eastern Europe even in peacetime.
The political reliability of Pact allies and particu-
larly Poland, considering current problems, has always been
questionable. Neither Poland nor East Germany can be
allowed to have an army or navy designed to serve only the
needs of homeland defense. In terms of the Soviet Baltic
fleet, Polish and East German forces are nearly always rele-
gated to a supportive and peripheral role. Only the Soviet
Navy is tailored in a comprehensive way to serve the needs
of an individual nation's political and military doctrine.
In situations short of war, Polish and GDR naval forces
are supposed to help cement an alliance weak on political
legitimacy. The Soviets must hope that they are indoc-
trinated, trained and positioned so that they will at best
be helpers and at worst be weak opponents if military power
must be brought to bear to ensure or restore Soviet-
dominated political order. Because the reliability of its
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allies is suspect, the Soviet Union has developed a military
doctrine that minimizes the options available to those"
allies. Polish and East German forces have been tied to
doctrine and force posture in such a way that the only
viable option is to become part of a Soviet "juggernaut",
and serve rather than disrupt the lines of communication.
Any dissident military or naval forces would be drawn in
behind the momentum of the massive Soviet military machine
as it moved west.
Neither the Polish Navy nor the East German Navy is
designed or disposed for nationalistic political purposes.
Instead, it is folded into a Soviet-led and Soviet-dominated
military offensive. All non-Soviet Warsaw Pact navies
reflect this reality and are not designed to operate very
far from their shores. In war they will perform tasks close
to home or in the wake of their senior ally, the USSR.
A. WARSAW PACT NAVAL POLICY
Warsaw Pact conventional war-fighting strategy in part
calls for the rapid seizure of Western Europe in order to
shift the battlefield away from Russian soil. Soviet
military planners prepare for the type of offensive battle
that would be dominated by the massive Soviet military
machine and would thoroughly determine the options for the
non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces. Warsaw Pact Baltic naval
strategy requires the rapid seizure and control of the
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Danish Straits, securing the coastal flank of the Soviet
ground forces and maintaining Warsaw Pact domination of the
Baltic Sea.
Only the Soviet Navy is allowed any global presence and
it is clearly apparent the East European navies are not
built with the endurance necessary to permit them the
freedom to range as far as Soviet units. The Polish and GDR
navies together comprise less than half of the surface ships
available to the Pact in the Baltic, even though those two
countries hold the majority of the Pact's Baltic coastline.
The Polish and East German navies do. provide a specialized
capability to the Soviet Union that is particularly impor-
tant in the Baltic region. As noted previously, the Poles
have a marine division and the East Germans a mobilized
rifle division, especially trained for amphibious opera-
tions, as well as a considerable amphibious ship capacity.
Like all Warsaw Pact naval units in the Baltic, these
forces are under the command of the Soviet headquarters in
Kaliningrad. Respective Polish and East German headquarters
are assigned subordinate level command functions that
usually remain separate from mixed formations. Unlike the
way in which East European Armies and Air Forces relate to
the Soviet Army and Air Force, Polish and East German naval
units frequently do not operate along side Soviet forces.
Even though East German and Polish officers are trained in
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Soviet naval schools, and there are numerous joint exer-
cises, cruises or various other exchanges, the respective
navies have relatively little day to day contact in
peacetime.
In 1977, Vittorio Gabaglio saw the Polish and East
German navies in extremely poor shape.
"The fact that they have no place in Soviet naval
strategy has led to the anomalous situation that
these nations which have imposing armies, very large,
well-trained air forces and very modern armament,
generally, have few ships most of which are obsolete
and not particularly well-armed or seaworthy."
Mr. Gabaglio is too critical. Both navies have a role
in Soviet naval strategy and have naval forces capable of
operations other than coastal defense. At present, it
appears that Soviet strategy intends to use these navies
only in the Baltic Sea; however, as Soviet naval strategy is
modified so might the naval role of its Baltic allies.
B. THE POLISH CONTRIBUTION
Generally, Polish naval forces still remain close to
home. They conduct frequent circumnavigations of the large
Danish island of Zealand and NATO's most eastern foothold in
Bornholm. Although the Warsaw Pact has superiority in all
Baltic ships, age and a recession economy have taken their
3
^
toll on Poland's naval strength.
According to Milan N. Vego: "The Polish Navy's
principal peacetime tasks are the surveillance of the
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country's coastline, participation in Warsaw Pact exercises,
and intelligence-gathering missions in the Baltic and its
approaches. Its chief wartime missions would be to conduct
joint operations with the Soviet Baltic Fleet and East
German Navy, to augment the amphibious lift capability of
the other Warsaw Pact forces, to support the army's maritime
flank, and to defend the country's coast."
The Polish Navy consists of about 140 combatants, of
which 50 are coastal patrol craft; many are obsolescent. As
presently composed, the Polish Navy is unbalanced. The ASW
capability, unlike the East German Navy's, is negligible and
Polish minesweeping capability is ill-suited for shallow
Baltic waters. Since 1980, apart from a few landing craft,
no new ships have entered the Polish fleet. Many of
Poland's major combatants were acquired over the years from
the USSR, the last of which was transferred in 1970 when
Poland received a SAM Kotlin class destroyer. They have
also received several coastal patrol craft and four Whiskey
class submarines. The destroyer, the Whiskey class
submarines, the major portion of the patrol craft, and
eleven of 23 ocean minesweepers are obsolescent and badly in
need of replacement (see Appendix F)
.
It is only fair, however, to mention Poland's indigenous
shipbuilding industry, because it greatly contributes to
Poland's naval requirements as well as those of the Warsaw
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Pact. Notable among ships designed, constructed and
employed by Poland are the thirteen Obluze class large
patrol boats, and the Polish version of the Soviet Polnochny
LCT class, both built in Gdansk. Warsaw Pact sea power has
also been enhanced by Poland's ability to produce a large
number of amphibious ships and commercial vessels for the
USSR. Foremost among these are over thirteen Ropucha class
amphibious ships built since 1975. Numerous general purpose
repair ships ( Amur and Oskol classes) , survey ships ( Nilolai
Zubov
, Samara , and Kamenka classes) , as well as several
other ship types, have been transferred to the USSR in
recent years.
The major contribution of the Polish Navy to the Warsaw
Pact is the amphibious capability that it possesses.
Twenty-three ships, almost one-sixth of the Polish Navy, are
devoted to amphibious forces. They presently maintain eight
Polnochny LCTs , four Marabut LCMs and fifteen Eichstaden
LCAs . The Polnochny is armed with four 30mm twin guns and
two 18-barreled 140mm rocket launchers. Each ship is
capable of carrying up to six tanks or other large assault
vehicles
.
However, the aging Polish navy inventory no longer lists
any ships for underway replenishment, only five ships for
fleet support and nine auxilliary vessels.
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Poland's shipbuilding capability is more than adequate
to construct larger and better equipped ships. Was the
division of mission not assigned by the USSR or the Poles
independent of Soviet control, they would no doubt see
utility in a more balanced fleet and would be likely not to
concentrate on the disproportionally large amphibious force
they presently maintain.
C. THE EAST GERMAN CONTRIBUTION
The GDR Navy actually has a few more ships than the
Polish Navy, but there are no East German fixed wing naval
aircraft. About one-half, or 32 of the 175 ships in the GDR
Navy are small coastal patrol craft. They also maintain
twelve small amphibious ships with eight underway
replenishment and supply ships (see Appendix G) . Unlike
Poland, the GDR has no present submarine capability. Still
it has adequate and improving forces to perform its role in
the Baltic.
The peacetime tasks of the East German Navy are coastal
surveillance, joint operations with the Soviet Baltic Fleet
and Polish naval forces, and intelligence gathering in the
western Baltic. In wartime, the East German Navy is
expected to counter the superior West German naval forces in
the Baltic and assist in maintaining Warsaw Pact control in
that sea. Like the Polish Navy, it is expected to support
the maritime flank of the conventional land forces, defend
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the sea lines of communiciation and provide bases and
logistic support for Warsaw pact forces.
Ten years ago the East German Navy began a modernization
program which transformed its forces from a purely coastal
defense role into one capable of undertaking offensive
missions aimed at gaining control of the western Baltic.
Its antisubmarine and mine countermeasures capabilities are
considerable. Among recent improvements were the acquisi-
tion of two Soviet Koni class frigates and the construction
of a new class of 1200 ton ASW corvettes, the Parchim . The
first Parchim was commissioned on 9 April 81 with the
second on 3 September 81. These ships, initially coded
l, Bal-Com-4" by NATO, resembled the Soviet Grisha class small
ASW ships. The main armament on the Parchim class are four
16-inch ASW torpedo tubes and two twelve-tubed ASW rocket
launchers. For air defense it carries the 57mm and 30mm
dual purpose guns as well as the SA-N-5 "Grail" heat seeking
missile
.
The new Parchim also has a minelaying and depth charge
capability. These ships represent a quantum leap for the
East Germans and will eventually replace twelve unsuccessful
and obsolescent Hai-111 class combatants which will be
turned over to the Coastal Frontier Brigade (GBK) . The
Parchim program is expected to be completed by 1983 with as
many as twelve ships being built. Both the Koni and parchim
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classes mark a major strengthening of the East German Navy's
surface combatant force.
On the 16th of June 1981, two East German naval vessels,
the training ship Wilhelm Pieck and the salvage vessel Otto
von Guericke, made a several week trip out of the Baltic and
around Europe. They visited Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union
in the Black Sea. On 21 August 1981, both ships were
awarded the "Grand Voyage" badge by the East German govern-
ment. The badge was given to the ships for achievements in
performing special tasks during cruises and for "exemplary
relations in comradeship-in-arms" . This was the first out
of area deployment of any East German navy combatant for
some time and may be an indication of a change in the East
German role and a plan to deploy more frequently outside the
Baltic. 7
One remaining urgent task facing the GDR ' s fleet is
replacement of its aging fifteen Osa I '
s
and eighteen
Shershens . They were built in the late 1960s. Recent
indications are that at least the Osa'
s
will be modernized
to receive the SS-N-2C. Both classes are presently
outdated. Also, the East German naval air arm presently
consists of only eight Mi-14 land-based ASW helicopters and
there is presently no shipboard capability. It is likely




Like Poland, East Germany has an adequate ship building
capability. All the combatants, except 38 ex-Soviet
vessels, were built in East Germany and about 75 percent of
them entered service in the last ten years. They are
presently building the small Libelle-class torpedo boats and
the Frosch-class LSMs . East German shipyards do not share
the large capacity of the Poles but their facilities are
more than sufficient to continue the present pace of the
East German modernization program. It is probable that East
Germany, if the USSR were disposed to tolerate longer reins
on its German ally, could build and maintain a more
formidable navy.
D. JOINT OPERATIONS
Joint exercises between Poland, East Germany and the
USSR have been conducted regularly since 1957. This
cooperation has significantly increased in the last decade
and the exercises have steadily moved westward. As a rule,
Soviet naval officers have been in command and the apparent
purpose is to achieve uniform tactics and operations.
Recent emphasis in these exercises is on amphibious assault
and landing operations. Here the Polish and East German
navies provide important elements in terms of both ships and
amphibious assault forces. However, even during the OKEAN
exercises of 1970 and 1975, Polish and East German forces
remained in the Baltic. The Baltic amphibious manuevers
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have gradually moved from Soviet to Polish, and with OKEAN
75, to East German waters.
Both Poland and East Germany participate regularly in an
annually held exercise dubbed "Defense of the Homeland" off
the East German island of Rugen. In July 1980, for the
first time joint manuevers were conducted in the North Sea.
This was the first assignment of Polish and East German
forces outside Baltic waters.
In September 1981 at the height of the Polish troubles
with Solidarity, the USSR held ZAPAD 81 (West 81) in the
Baltic Sea. ZAPAD was a joint service ground-air-naval
exercise involving 100,000 troops of the ground forces and
some 80 ships from all four Soviet fleets. Never before had
ships assigned to all four fleets been gathered together in
a small area for a single naval exercise. The largest scale
peacetime amphibious exercise the Soviets have ever
conducted was part of ZAPAD 81. However, not a single unit
from either Poland or East Germany was involved in this
exercise. ZAPAD was a clear reminder of the dominating
power of Soviet naval forces and the subordinate position of
the comparatively small Warsaw Pact navies as well as an
indication of the lack of Soviet trust in their allies to




Although the Polish and East German navies are fully
incorporated into the first echelon of Warsaw Pact
organization and would be immediately involved in any
conflict in Europe, Soviet strategy does not currently call
for a separate attack against NATO on one of the flanks.
Presently, Warsaw Pact maritime operations against the
flanks are considered vital but thoroughly integrated into a
complex strategy for subduing and controlling Europe.
Moreover, Soviet military strategists envision a coordinated
attack on all fronts as part of a major war between the two
blocs. Warsaw Pact navies are not intended to operated in a
limited war, either in terms of geography or in terms of
g
weapons employed. Dominating sea lines of communications
to isolate Europe from American and the Middle East,
controlling ingress and egress from the Baltic, and
supporting the westward advance of Warsaw Pact ground forces
are the major strategic missions of the Baltic Pact navies.
Ongoing production programs in the Soviet Navy indicate
that emphasis is being placed on larger, better equipped
ships with reloadable weapons systems and longer on station
times. It seems reasonable to assume that as the Soviet
Navy modernizes, so too will the other navies of the Warsaw
Pact, but on a smaller scale. Despite many deficiencies
that exist in their respective fleets, the Polish and East
German naval threat must be taken seriously by NATO. As
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their effectiveness and capabilities expand, their role in a
Baltic confrontation could also expand. By their very
existence and growing presence they play an important role
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Flanked by NATO and Soviet-aligned Finland, Sweden has a
policy of armed neutrality and non-alignment between great
power blocs. Because its neutrality is supported by a
strong defense, Sweden holds the position as the balancing
force in the North. In the past, this position has
successfully allowed Sweden to avoid two World Wars and
still maintain one of the highest standards of living in the
world. They have repeatedly allayed Soviet suspicions and
constrained Soviet advances in the north while at the same
time attempting to reduce the Soviet pressure on Finland.
Frequently acting as a Nordic conscience, Sweden's
behavior as an international actor has resulted in a growing
tension between basic values and attitudes. There is a
strong element of global internationalism existing side by
side with parochial narrowness and isolationism. Sweden
appears drawn between an emotional and idealistic solidarity
with third world countries and the desire to avoid any
relationships or organizations which might pull Sweden
closer to East or West. The Swedish Social Democratic Party
Congress in 1975 supported the idea that the real security
problem in the world was the desperate poverty of the
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underdeveloped world; hence defense appropriations should be
transferred to development aid.
None the less, the policy of armed neutrality has
provided Sweden with a viable national defense as a
corollary to non-alignment and neutrality. From a military
point of view, Sweden's defense, in one specific sense, has
made it the most important country in Northern Europe during
the last decade. The military strength of a country
consists partly of its own strength and partly of the
borrowed strength of its allies. The logic of non-alignment
and neutrality is that Sweden cannot have access to borrowed
strength as a peacetime deterrent.
Denmark and Norway build much of their security on
borrowed strength. They assign their own resources to
specific tasks in the common defense of their own countries;
however, it is the borrowed strength of the alliance
membership that provides the deterrent effect on their
military defense. It has often been argued that a neutral,
well-defended Sweden contributes to the credibility of the
Norwegian defense, for any direct overland attack requires
passage through Swedish territory. It is actually more a
matter of mutual dependence that benefits both NATO and
Sweden. The NATO-Swedish security linkage is based on
strong Swedish defense, increased Norwegian security,
credible NATO relief and a stronger Nordic Balance, hence
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greater security for Sweden, provided that the goal of the
attacker is beyond Sweden.
Sweden has historically maintained a large well-equipped
military, and has consistently allocated 3.5 percent of its
GNP annually for defense. Without the presence of Swedish
armed forces, in both the north and south, neither Denmark
nor Norway could tolerate their present restrictions on
basing and pre-posi tioning of men and equipment on their
territories during peacetime. Any change in these policies
would have a destabilizing effect on the Nordic Balance and
likely bring increased Soviet pressure to bear on Finland.
In the past, Sweden has been able to successfully juggle its
national policies to maintain a balance yet avoid offical
ties with either power bloc.
Recent years have seen Sweden's position threatened by
several factors: the increasing importance of the Murmansk
base for Soviet strategic forces; the growth and outward
movement of the Soviet Navy (e.g., the Karlskrona incident);
fishing and oil rights disputes between Sweden and the
Soviet Union; the increasing burden of defense on the
Swedish economy; and the Norwegian perception of political
and military isolation in the far North.
It is this Norwegian factor that in 1980 resulted in
both Sweden and Finland stationing additional troops in the
North. Norwegian nervousness had resulted in increased NATO
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military exercises and a September 1980 U. S. -Norweg ian
agreement on the pre-posi tioning of military equipment and
construction of depots in the province of Trondelag, 600
miles south of Troms. Sweden viewed these moves as
counterproductive to the Nordic Balance because of the
critical importance of the Murmansk base to the Soviet
Union. However, they understood that a viable attack
against Norway would come through Swedish territory,
territory Sweden intended to defend. The placement of
Swedish and Finnish troops to a degree allayed both the
Norwegian sense of isolation and the Soviet anxieties about
NATO reinforcements. Thus, NATO's interests were satisfied
in two respects by the Neutrals, and Nordic Balance was
restored. There has been a tendency for the West to dismiss
the contribution of the Swedish military, yet they have
frequently provided political and military balancing that
has greatly benefited NATO, perhaps even more than if Sweden
has been a member of the alliance.
In any Baltic naval conflict Sweden's capability to deny
the use of its territorial waters and airspace to the Warsaw
Pact will effectively assist NATO planners in best allo-
cating their limited resources. For this reason, Swedish




The longest coast in the Baltic belongs to Sweden, which
extends for about 2,500nm. It runs roughly in a straight
line from the far northern corner of the Gulf of Bothnia to
Karlskrona in the south. The southern part of Sweden's
coast is sharply triangular. The Soviet controlled Baltic
coast forms a semicircle. In any conflict between the
Soviet Union and Sweden, the latter' s coast would offer
better opportunities for the employment of naval forces and
aviation, due to a longer base of operations. Sweden's
coast would allow a rapid shifting of forces along its
longitudinal axis and offer much shorter lines of operation
for the Swedish fleet. Aside from this one advantage, such
a long coastline is an extremely difficult one to guard.
Over much of the length it is covered with hundreds of
islands and water depths that vary considerably from just a
few feet to over 190 feet in places. Furthermore, the
factors affecting sound propagation in water and a varying
type of sea bed create enormous problems for effective anti-
submarine operations. It is mainly because of this
geography that Sweden has created a defense in depth similar
to the Danish and West German strategies which are discussed
in a later chapter.
1. Sweden's Maritime Defense Strategy
The Swedish Navy is divided into two arms, the Naval
Fleet and the Coast Artillery (see Appendix I). Both
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operate in close cooperation and are built around the
Government's major requirement of preventing an agressor,
invading by sea, from establishing himself on Swedish
territory. The Navy provides four major elements of defense
(light surface units, underwater units, mine warfare units,
and the naval air arm) while Coast Artillery provides both
2fixed and mobile artillery units.
The Swedish defensive system is designed to come
into operation as far from the Swedish coast as possible,
and is based on a series
v
of barriers. The outermost barrier
comprises attack aircraft of the Swedish Air Force and
submarines of the Navy. Traditionally, Sweden's enemies
have attacked from the sea and Sweden's present leadership
views the southern coast region as the most critical to
defend. Thirty percent of the army and three of four
armored brigades are located in Military Command South. The
Navy is concentrated in the 500km archipelago from the
Bothnia bottleneck to Karlskrona. The Air Force, although
more spread out and responsible for the air defense of all
of Sweden, has much of its force stationed in the south.
The JA-37 Viggen intercepter/attack squadrons are also
oriented toward maritime attack.
Sweden fully expects any invasion to be stopped at
sea. However, the role of the Air Force and Navy is not to
sink or destroy the opposing force but rather to abort the
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invasion. Swedish defense relies on the timely emplacement
and protection of elaborate minefields. Once the mines are
in place (many are simply activated) , the country is
effectively shielded. The attack submarines and viggens
help obtain the time for mine emplacement.
The fast patrol boat navy and Coast Artillery orient
themselves around these mine obstacles. Enemy warships are
not the prime targets. Instead, the Swedish Navy plans to
concentrate on soft targets like mine sweepers and troop
transports. Enemy warships would be avoided if possible.
This strategy accomplishes the mission of halting an attack
while simultaneously reducing the size of the weapon
required. In a sea attack, the fast patrol boats and Viggen
aircraft work together. The FPBs force the enemy to place
naval escorts forward to protect the minesweepers. But in
doing so, unless a large fleet is present, he leaves a less
defended target for the Viggens.
This scheme is designed to effectively protect the
Swedish coast from the Aland Islands to Karlskrona and the
west coast to Goteborg (see Appendix B) . The Kattegat is
protected by NATO and the Gulf of Bothnia will be closed in
war by a Swedish minefield at the Alands.
2. Swedish Baltic Considerations
In 1979, Sweden made the decision to increase the
width of its territorial waters from four to twelve nautical
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miles. This increased Swedish territorial jurisdiction by
about 10 percent and created additional responsibility for
the Navy. The problem of maintaining surveillance over this
territory is not so serious from a surface point of view
because units from the navy and coast guard work together.
The problem is underwater. Sweden does not presently have
sufficient surveillance forces, either submarines or
maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) , to cover the underwater
portion of its territory.
In recent years there have been a number of
territorial violations by foreign powers, both in the air
and, at sea, some by accident, others not. The most widely
publicized was the Soviet submarine 137 which ran ashore
near Karlskrona naval base in the autumn of 1981. A more
recent incident was in October 1982 when Swedish forces
unsuccessfully attempted to bring an unknown contact to the
surface while in violation of Swedish territory. These two
particular incidents and the international attention they
drew, caused Swedish authorities to reevaluate their anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities.
New Swedish regulations will go into effect on
July 1, 1983, in which foreign submarines will be forced to
surface and escorted to a berth for identification and
further examination. For this purpose, new weapons are
being developed that will provide the Swedish Navy with the
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capability to damage or disable a submarine sufficiently to
force it to the surface.
Sweden's Prime Minister, Olof Palme, officially
reminded the world that the Swedish government can give the
armed forces the order to sink a foreign submarine in
Swedish territorial waters. On April 26, 1983, Sweden
officially warned the Kremlin that it would destroy the next
Soviet submarine that violates Swedish waters. In order to
make this threat credible, the Swedes have decided to refit
additional search and rescue helicopters with ASW equipment
and have ordered new missile boats with an ASW mission
capability.
As part of the 1982 Defense Decision, the most
recent defense five year plan, 200 million Swedish Crowns
were earmarked for anti-submarine warfare. This is over and
above that earlier planned for. Though this figure breaks
down to only 40 million Crowns a year, it still is a
significant move to improve Sweden's ability to protect the
underwater portion of its territory, a capability which the
last few years have proven necessary.
Aside from the increased incursions on Swedish
territory by the Soviet Union, there remains another source
of continual contention between the two governments. Since
1969, negotiations have been intermittently conducted to
settle a boundary dispute in the Baltic. (Talks between
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Norway and the Soviet Union on the demarcation line in the
Barents Sea have not yet led to a fixed boundary either.)
The dispute centers around fishing and oil rights in a
13,500 square km region east of the Swedish island of
Gotland (see Appendix J). The last attempt to settle the
dispute was a politically unpopular Swedish compromise
proposal that involved small Swedish concessions on their
. • 7
original position. This proposal did not settle the
dispute and has so far been rejected by the Kremlin. At the
time of this writing, negotiations have not been resumed.
Swedish defense is the most important internal
Nordic military factor. How strong Swedish defense must be
to fulfill its national and Nordic role is not easily
answered. After two years of inadequate defense spending,
it appears that the growing Soviet threat has encouraged the
Swedish government to institute a three-pronged development
and acquisition program in fiscal year 1984. The program
will address the undersea threat which has already been
discussed; the northern threat which will involve the
relocation of a JA-37 Viggen intercepter squadron to Lulea
in northern Sweden, as well as upgrading the air defense
facilities in the area; and the aerial threat from across
the Baltic which will incorporate a new air-to-air missile
for the viggen, a contract for the first 30 of a planned 140
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JAS-39 Gripen multirole combat aircraft, and a new low level
o
surveillance radar system.
The proposed 1983-1984 defense budget totals $2.85
billion and includes about $280 million for air force
equipment procurement, excluding the JAS-39 Gripen for which
$600 million has already been allocated. The budget will
not be approved by the Swedish parliament until late 1983,
but it is expected to pass without significant change. The
Social Democrats, who came to power in 1982, are not likely
9
to change long standing defense considerations.
In addition to the defense budget, the government is
proposing to allocate $118 million for civil defense and $73
million for stockpiling critical materials.
It is certainly in NATO's best interest that Swedish
defenses not deteriorate. Both Danish and Norwegian defense
plans rely on Sweden being capable to maintain control of
its territorial waters and air space. Just as Finland
provides Sweden with a Soviet buffer, so in turn Sweden
provides a type of strategic depth for NATO. • Any change in
Sweden's defense capability would affect Nordic security as
both power blocs might attempt to fill the resulting void.
For Finland's eastern-oriented, confidence-building
policy, it is important that Sweden remain non-aligned. For
this reason, Swedish defense might well be of greater impor-
tance for Finland's security than Finland's own defense.
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The preservation of a genuinely Nordic role for Finland is
dependent on a Finnish defense strong enough that the Soviet
Union does not raise demands for direct participation in it.
B. FINLAND
1. Finnish-Soviet Relations
The birthplace of " Finlandi zation" has not always
been as closely tied to the Soviet Union as it is now. One
of the five traditionally Scandinavian states, Finland had,
until the end of World War II, always looked to the West for
its most important political and economic cooperation.
However, after suffering defeat twice at the hands of the
Soviets, survival required a different political outlook.
It is important to understand the relationship that has
developed between the USSR and Finland, so a brief histori-
cal perspective is presented.
The basis of Finnish foreign policy since World
War II has been neutrality, but a neutrality tinged with the
realization of the proximity of Soviet power. The Finnish
position at the end of the war was that of a defeated enemy
of a country which had emerged from the war as the most
powerful state in Europe. The Finnish position was untena-
ble. Economically weakened by the war and faced with the
Soviet Union on its border, some foresaw the eventual
annexation of Finland. To the credit of the Finnish
leadership, Finland was able to avoid this fate. The
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responsibility for this accomplishment lies primarily with
Juho K. Paasikivi, the architect of Finland's postwar
foreign policy. The foundation for this policy was a new
orientation toward the Soviet Union. Paasikivi insisted
that the reality of Finland's position vis a vis the Soviet
Union required that the Finns change their old, hostile
attitudes toward the Russians and instead work toward
friendship and cooperation in order to establish "good and
faithful relations with our great neighbor."
Although Paasikivi had long stressed the necessity
of coming to terms with the Soviet Union, Soviet trust in
him was not so great that they wanted to leave any doubt as
to the future of Finnish foreign policy. The Soviet Union
wanted to have a document which placed Soviet-Finnish
relations on a legal basis. In February 1948, the Soviets
approached Finland suggesting a treaty of mutual assistance.
Despite the fear that the Soviets intended to subjugate
Finland, President Paasikivi agreed to negotiate. What
resulted was a very different treaty from that originally
envisioned by the Soviets.
The Soviet-Finnish Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation
and Mutual Assistance has been the legal basis for Finnish-
Soviet relations since its signing in 1948. It is a
concise, explicit document. While recognizing Finland's
desire to "remain outside the conflicting interests of the
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Great Powers" , it goes on to pledge that should Finland or
the Soviet Union be attacked through Finnish territory by
Germany or an ally of Germany, Finland will fight to repel
the attack within its territory and, if necessary, with the
assistance of, or jointly with, the Soviets. Such assis-
tance must be mutually agreed upon. If a situation arises
in which an attack appears likely, the parties are bound to
confer with each other on necessary action. The deter-
mination of whether or not a threat exists is also to be
mutual
.
Some analysts of Soviet foreign policy regard the
treaty as the harbinger of " Finlandi zation" destined to
envelope the rest of Scandinavia. The bottom line is that
the Soviets demanded an agreement in which Finland's foreign
policy would not clash with the security interests of the
USSR. In reality, Finland was compelled to sign away part
of its sovereignty. Time and again the Soviets have
attempted to influence or interfere in Finnish affairs.
Blatant Soviet intervention in Finnish foreign
policy has been less noticeable in recent years. It seems
that the Finns have become adept at predicting Soviet
preferences and have attempted to forestall Soviet pressure
by acting in a favorable way. The Finnish government has
consistently made a demonstrative show of support for Soviet
policies when they are in agreement, while refraining from
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public disagreement. This has been consistent over time as
evidenced by the government's reaction to Soviet interven-
tions in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968) and, most
recently, Afghanistan (1979) . On December 31, 1979 the
Finnish Foreign Minister issued a mild statement which
pointed out Finland's desire to see the situation in
Afghanistan return to normal as soon as possible and noted
that the Soviet government had assured Finland that Soviet
troops would be withdrawn as soon as the situation
allowed. Finland has also been quick to follow the Soviet
lead in criticizing United States' actions, e.g., proposal
for a NATO multilateral atomic force (1962-1963) , Dominican
Republic (1965), Vietnam (1965-1973), Chile (1973) and the
planned deployment of enhanced radiation weapons in Europe
14(1977) .
Finland avoids alliances with all countries to the
extent possible in order to legitimize its longstanding
claim to neutrality. The 1948 treaty has consistently been
interpreted by the Finns in the strictest sense possible,
despite Soviet attempts to force a more general interpre-
tation which would result in closer Finnish-Soviet ties.
This means that Finland is required to act only if its
neutrality is violated. This could be expected to elicit a
response from any state, regardless of its treaty status.
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Finland has consistently refused to participate in joint
military exercises with the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union has often managed to influence the
Finnish government in its makeup as well as its policy
through government statements and use of the media. The
first indication of a Soviet response or policy initiative
is frequently expressed through Pravda or Izvestia . An
example of this was the Soviet press treatment of the
Finnish Social Democrats just prior to the 1966 elections.
The Social Democrats had been unacceptable to the Soviet
Union since World War II. However, in 1966 their prospects
for electoral success were good. The Soviets began a press
campaign on February 1965 designed, not to keep the Social
Democrats out of government, but to exact promises con-
cerning their adherence to the current foreign policy line
and loyalty to President Kekkonen. This resulted in the
inclusion of Communists in the government after hints in
Izvestia that this would make the Social Democrats
acceptable. By 1981, after years of Social Democratic
protestation concerning their loyalty and friendship toward
the Soviet Union, Moscow's trust had increased to the point
that it supported the Finnish choice to succeed President
Kekkonen: Mauno Koivisto, a Social Democrat. After his
accession, President Koivisto reaffirmed Finland's
neutrality and friendly relations with the Soviet Union and
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called for extension of the 1948 treaty past its already
1
8
extended expiration in 1990.
2. Finland's Baltic Contribution
The Finnish Navy consists primarily of fast patrol
craft, plus two corvettes, three minelayers, and six inshore
minesweepers. By the terms of the 1947 peace treaty,
Finland is not allowed to possess a Navy larger than 4,500
men and totaling more than 10,000 tons. Also, Finnish ships
were prohibited from carrying offensive weapons. However,
19in the 1960s the ban on missiles was lifted.
The Finnish Navy is a typical coastal force.
Although designed for defense, its capability to success-
fully defend the country's coast appears to be inadequate.
Its principal wartime missions would be defense against
amphibious attack, defensive minelaying, transportation of
troops and material between the mainland coast and offshore
islands, and surveillance of the coast. In 1980, the
Finnish Navy consisted of 50 combatants plus two dozen naval
auxiliaries. A separate coast guard, under the Ministry of
the Interior, comprised five large and some 106 small
coastal craft. It is unlikely that the Finnish Navy would
play any role in a Baltic conflict other than national
defense
.
Finland's role in the Baltic rests on its ability to
continue to hold an active Nordic position in the region's
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balance between East and West and not succumb to Soviet
domination. Finland's position is similar to Sweden's in
that any change in Finland's political position could have a
destabilizing effect on the security of the region.
While Finnish armed forces pose little threat to the
Soviet Union, they are sufficiently strong and well trained
to make a conventional attack somewhat costly for the
Soviets. Finland, in Russian hands, would provide the
Soviets with an occupied Nordic buffer state as a northern
extension of the Warsaw Pact eastern European alignment.
However, as long as Finland continues to take no action that
could be construed as hostile to Soviet interests, the
Soviets need not risk the damage to Western European detente
and the Nordic Balance that would result from such an
occupation
.
Finland has grown used to interpreting, and even to
anticipating, signals from the USSR and to finding verbal
and symbolic concessions which without infringing on the
essence of its freedom, reassures the Soviets. Addition-
ally, the USSR does not always seem to be of one mind in its
policy towards Finland. Time and again the policy seems to
be the outcome of "bureaucratic politics" , perhaps some
in-fighting, indecision and even confusion until the Kremlin
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THE BALTIC AND NATO'S DEFENSIVE RESPONSE
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The strength of the Atlantic Allies centers on the"
commitment of the allies to consider any armed attack on a
single member as an attack on all members. This commitment
must be central to any aggressor's planning. It is here
that NATO's deterrent begins. Whereas the Warsaw Pact might
be willing to assume the risks of a localized attack on an
isolated, non-allied country, it has so far been unwilling
to test the combined strength of the alliance.
Danish officials appear to anticipate three potential
levels of Warsaw Pact aggression: a general attack against
NATO; a limited attack against Denmark or parts of the
country; and political pressure against the Danish govern-
ment through limited employment or threat of employment of
military forces.
On the Northern Flank, because of the great distances
and the absence of allied troops, the responsibility for
meeting a Warsaw Pact first strike rests with national
forces. These forces must be capable of an initial defense
and holding vital ports and airfields until reinforcements
can arrive. Denmark, and its NATO partner, the Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG), are responsible for defending the
Baltic Approaches. The combined maritime capability of
these two nations must close the gates to the 3altic before
Warsaw Pact forces can move to control the Approaches in the
initial stage of conflict.
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In line with NATO's flexible response and the strategy
of forward defense, it is the mission of Allied Command
Baltic Approaches (COMBALTAP) under the direction of
CINCNORTH, to plan for the defense of the territories of
Denmark, the northern part of West Germany, and the adjacent
waters known as the Baltic Approaches. In wartime, the
forces of COMBALTAP will attempt to arrest and neutralize an
enemy offensive as early as possible. The chance that such
an attempt will be successful is greatly enhanced the
further off that the response can be achieved from friendly
coasts and vital sea lanes.
Like other NATO operational strategies, Baltic security
depends heavily on sufficient warning time- and the will to
use it, to allow for mobilization and reinforcement. Warsaw
Pact forces can be positioned only minutes away under the
guise of naval exercises, making allied units particularly
vulnerable to a first strike. It is possible to envision a
scenario where warning time is non-existent or at least
considerably reduced, thereby demanding timely political and
military decisions.
On the military side, the people who will make those
imperative decisions are part of Headquarters Allied Forces
Baltic Approaches, one of the most recently formed commands
in NATO. It was established on 8 January 1962 in Karup,
Denmark and activated on 1 July 1962. The Commander Allied
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Forces Baltic Approaches is always Danish, the Deputy
COMBALTAP is German, and the Chief of Staff Danish.
The area covered by this command comprises all of
Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein , including Hamburg north of
the Elbe River and the adjacent sea areas. Guarding the
gates of the Baltic, it reaches from the Skagen to the Elbe
and from the island of Bornholm to the North Sea at the Elbe
mouth (see Appendices A and B) .
COMBALTAP has four subordinate commanders:
1) CQMLANDJUT is responsible for the defense of
Schleswig-Holstein, Jutland and Funen . He has operational
command in time of war of the German 6th Armored Infantry
Division and the Danish Jutland Division. Each consists of
three brigades. This position alternates between Danish and
German commanders with the Chief of Staff the opposite
nationality.
2) COMLANDZEALAND is responsible for defense of the
Danish islands east of the Great Belt including Bornholm.
He has a total of two Brigades and one reduced brigade on
Bornholm. However, after mobilization of the Danish home
guard, this force will have an additional five brigades.
This position is always held by a Dane.
3) COMAIRBALTAP has operational command in time of war
of the entire Danish Air Force and the German Air Force
units stationed in Schleswig-Holstein. There are four
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tactical fighter-bomber squadrons and one reconnaissance
squadron in northern Germany. However, air control of those
units comes under the control of CINCENT. COMAIRBALTAP
leadership alternates in the same fashion as that of
COMLANDJUT.
4) COMNAVBALTAP has, with a few exceptions, all
operational Danish and German naval forces (including the
German Naval Air Arm) under his operational command in time
of war. This position also alternates between German and
Danish leadership.
From this command structure it is clear that Danish and
German forces are closely integrated in the area of Baltic
defenses. The territorial integrity of both nations depends
on this cooperation.
Chief of Defense, Welcome to Denmark
,
(Copenhagen
Danish Information Service, 1977), p. 18.
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V. DENMARK: GATEKEEPER OF THE BALTIC
A. WHY NATO?
For more than one hundard years, Denmark's position has
been that of a small power with limited materials and human
resources. Its territory is extremely hard to defend and
in an area dominated by Great Powers. After the war in
1864, in which the Danes were badly defeated by Germany (the
annexation of southern Jutland was not resolved until 1920),
the Danish government adopted a policy of isolated
neutrality. This policy appeared to work for a while, and
kept Denmark out of the First World War. Although many
Conservatives felt strongly that states should have the
capability to defend their own sovereignty, the larger
political parties of the Social Democrats and the Liberals
believed that disarmament would best serve Danish interests
and prove that Denmark had no intentions of military action.
Hitler's rise to power in the late 1930s caused
considerable alarm in Denmark. At that time, Danish defense
forces were small and very poorly equipped. The 1937
Defense Act signaled a change in Danish policy. The Danish
government feared the rising power to the south and began to
build the framework necessary to improve its defense
capabilities. However, few of the 1937 defense improvements
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were ever realized. In April 1940, Germany quickly invaded
and occupied Denmark. For the next five years Danish -under-
ground resistance forces battled the Nazis, but with limited
success. This stubborn resistance did, however, greatly
contribute to a rise of new Danish nationalism. In 1945,
when Denmark was liberated, all major parties were at last
in agreement; Danish defense policy warranted reconsidera-
tion in terms of Danish security interests.
The Danish government was faced with three options:
1) it could maintain a policy of neutrality with a low-
posture appearance and non-engagement in international power
politics; 2) it could build a significant defense force with
the capability of defending its own territory; 3) it could
seek an alignment with other powers.
The onset of the Cold War, and especially its aggrava-
tion in the spring of 1948, convinced the Danish government
of the necessity of finding an alternative to the security
policy it had followed before the war. Neutrality was no
longer considered a sufficient foundation for security. The
first option was ruled out. Denmark had been making efforts
in 1948-1949 to obtain increased security from the United
States and Great Britain through agreements for external
guarantees. The Danish government had to start from scratch
in 1945 to rebuild its defense forces, and little had been
accomplished by 1948. There were strict limitations on how
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much Danish resources could be channeled into a rapid
military build-up in competition with civilian needs.
The Danes asked for quite extensive American military
supplies in the spring of 1948 and indicated their wish to
2
receive security guarantees from the West. The problem
with this policy was that the United States demanded
military commitments. This was a condition for the security
guarantees as well as the shipping of armaments in large
quantities and on favorable terms. In addition, enormous
economic requirements and manpower commitments required to
establish a defense force strong enough to defend far
reaching Danish territory was not thought feasible.
The real choice, therefore, was one of alignment.
Several options available were: 1). membership in the
Brussels Pact of March 17, 1948; 2) the creation of a
Scandinavian Defense Union (SDU); 3) membership in the
Atlantic Pact.
B. A DANISH CHOICE
The Danes appear to have been more affected than either
Sweden or Norway by the threats of the Soviet Union. In
January and February of 1948, the Soviet press launched a
strongly worded anti-alliance campaign against Denmark.
They warned against any type of alignment that would bring
Denmark or Scandinavia closer to the West. The Soviets
preferred a policy of neutrality and non-alignment which,
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they hoped, would leave Denmark vulnerable to their sphere
of influence. In addition, Denmark's geographical proximity
to the Soviet military center of gravity as well as to the
most likely war zone in the event of great power conflict,
gave her an exposed position. The Danish government
strongly preferred the formation of a Nordic organization,
which it felt represented less of a threat to the Soviet
Union, but Norwegian and Swedish security disagreements
prevented its development. The time had come to make the
Atlantic option a political reality.
There was considerable doubt within the government as to
whether the Altantic Pact could fulfill the security needs
of Denmark. It was repeatedly stressed that primary to
Denmark, was a guarantee of swift and effective aid in the
event of concrete military aggression. It is doubtful
whether the Western Powers would be able to intervene before
it was too late. They also feared the risk of too close a
relationship with the West and the risk of being too
involved in distant conflicts, or of being automatically and
instantaneously attacked by the Soviet Union in the event of
a general war. However, the Atlantic Pact offered a
position more consistent with Danish demands for an ideal
security solution than did any remaining option.
Because of American interests in Greenland, Denmark had
an assurance of being accepted as a member of the Atlantic
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Pact. Since 1941, the United States has had military bases
in Greenland, and in April 1948, the Danish government gave
assurance that this cooperation would continue.
The strategic position of Denmark was also a
consideration. In 1948, the primary bases for Soviet
submarines were in the Baltic Sea. In order for the
submarines to enter the Altantic, they had to pass through
the Sound or the Belts, and further on the Skagerrak, where
the northern coast of Jutland and the southern part of
Norway constitute the last barrier to the North Sea and the
Atlantic. The possession or control of Danish territory
would consequently be important to the Soviet Union as well
as Western sea powers.
On April 4, 1949, Mr. Gustav Rasmussen, the Danish
Foreign Minister, signed the North Atlantic Treaty with
eleven other representatives of the Western World. It is
interesting to note that every parliamentary election and
opinion poll since 1949 has indicated that a majority of the
4people continue to favor NATO membership. Denmark may not
be content with all the policies of NATO, but on the whole,
Danish politicians are convinced that NATO strikes the
optimal balance between military security and freedom to
conduct an independent foreign policy.
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C. NATO'S "CORK IN THE BOTTLE"
Denmark, with the peninsula of Jutland and a total of
some 450 islands (including Zealand, Funen and Bornholm as
the largest ones), covers 43,000 sq. km with a population of
about five million people, 40 percent of whom live on the
eastern part of Zealand around Copenhagen. Because the
Danish Straits divide the territory basically into three
parts, maintaining the integrity of Denmark is directly
related to control of these Straits.
The Copenhagan Treaty of 1857 and the Geneva Convention
of 1958 stated that Denmark in a time of peace could not
prevent or interfere with the innocent passage of any ship,
including warships. However, in accordance with current
International Law, Denmark does exercise certain restric-
tions on warships when they are in Danish waters (see
Appendix D)
.
The Straits provide the only natural entrance and exist
to the Baltic and it is clearly to the advantage of NATO
that this access is controlled by a member nation.
The Soviets control the White Sea Canal, which connects
5the forces of the Northern Fleet with the Baltic. However,
as World War II demonstrated, this long canal is extremely
vulnerable to air attacks. The Nord-Ostsee Canal, or Kiel
Canal, runs across northern Germany from the North Sea port
of Brunsbuttel Koog to Kiel on the Baltic. This canal is
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rather short in comparison, only 61 miles long, and the
transit can be accomplished in about ten hours. This saves
about two days sailing time around the Danish peninsula.
Still, with a width of about 100 yards and minimum depth of
34 feet, it shares many of the limitations of the White Sea
Canal. It is highly vulnerable to enemy air attack and
mining; it requires a slow, exposed transit; and it imposes
restrictions on the size of the shipping that it can
support
.
When Denmark joined NATO, the largest Soviet fleet was
located in the Baltic. As noted in Chapter II, this is not
the case today. Soviet maritime expansion has resulted in a
shift to the Arctic. Only in the north can Soviet ships
avoid passing a natural choke point in order to gain access
to the open sea.
Because of this shift in forces, some NATO strategists
have questioned the importance of Denmark's position, and at
first glance this may appear justified. However, in
addition to the Danish importance as the "cork" which could
seal the Baltic in time of war, Denmark also serves as a
buffer region which protects both southern Norway and the
German heartland.
As a member of the Alliance, Denmark provides an •
important contribution by indirectly bolstering the defenses
of southern Norway. The Danes have enabled the Norwegian
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defense forces to concentrate on the north, where Norway
shares a common border with the Soviet Union, and on the
rugged, sparsely populated coastal region.
The large amphibious forces of Warsaw Pact would first
pass by Danish islands or through the Danish mainland in
order to launch an attack on Germany. Denmark also provides
an important bridge between Norway and NATO countries of the
Central Front through which supplies, communications and
reinforcements can be transported.
The mission of Danish defense forces, from a NATO
standpoint, is to repel intrusions on Danish territory,
maintain the security of reinforcement positions, and more
strategically important, control the entrahce to the Baltic.
Conservative Danish politicians (and recently NATO planners)
have begun to question the capability of Danish units to
accomplish that mission.
Traditional Danish military forces, designed to resist
such an invasion, have been sadly reduced in the last
decade. Denmark has become heavily dependent on external
reinforcements for even the initial defense. In 1953, the
Danish government decided against allowing any foreign bases
or military units on Danish soil during peace time. In
1957, it also decided to forbid placement of nuclear weapons
within Danish territory, including Greenland. With a
country as geographically susceptible to conventional attack
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as Denmark, many analysts have been quick to point out that
an attack is less likely if forces are in place, ready and
able to prevent a quick Soviet military success. These
Danish decisions have created a large obstacle to defense
planners. Without the pre-positioning of allied forces or a
strong internal defense force, Denmark's security has come
to rest heavily on its ability to recognize quickly and
respond to external threats.
1. Defense Policy and Force Levels
Since joining the Alliance, Danish defense strategy
has been firmly based on the policy of NATO. The Danish
government views the primary aim of NATO as that of
deterring war. To achieve this aim, NATO must be capable of
making it clear to an aggressor that any attack would be met
by a strong defense, and might initiate a sequence of events
which would involve risks to the aggressor that would be
unacceptable when compared to any advantage he might gain.
Danish Defense Forces in their present condition do
not present a viable defensive appearance. Denmark is torn
between trying to present a strong defensive capability and
yet not appearing as a threat to the security of Warsaw
Pact. Instead of committing the economic resources required
to maintain and strengthen its standing forces, the Defense
Agreement of 1973 caused Denmark to adopt a concept of
7 •
"Total Defense" in which nearly every able bodied man and
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woman has a wartime role. The standing Armed Forces of
Denmark were reduced, and it became necessary to increase
their reliance on mobilization. To balance this, an
increased number of regulars vice conscripts were required.
This agreement resulted in a somewhat unconventional
military structure.
Because all of Denmark' s forces are dedicated to
protecting Danish territory and thereby the Baltic
Approaches, it is important to discuss not only the maritime
capabilities but also the Army and Air Force contribution.
The Danish Peacetime Army is composed of: 1) train-
ing force of 5,750 (conscripts with nine months of National
Service); 2) administrative and training units of 7,250;
3) the Standing Force comprised of long term regulars of
8,500 and varied amounts of UN Forces which hope to bring
the total near 22,000. In wartime, when fully mobilized,
this force would total 145,000 personnel with the addition
of the Augmentation Force and the Reserve and Home Guard
Force, to which should be added approximately 12,000 men
gheld in Personnel Replacement Depots. The Augmentation
Force is comprised of conscripts and regulars still serving
or having been released from service, who are under
obligation to report at very short notice. The Danish Home
Guard is a tri-service force of approximately 72,000
volunteer men and women, of which 55,000 will report to the
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army during wartime. Home Guard soldiers keep their
weapons, ammunition and personal equipment in their homes.
The main fighting unit of the Field Army (the Standing Force
and the Augmentation Force) is the Armored Infantry Brigade,
of which there are three in Jutland and two in Zealand. In
addition, Bornholm Island has a force with strength corres-
ponding to that of a reduced infantry brigade.
The Army's main battle tank is the German built
Leopard. They have 180 medium tanks (120 Leopard/60
Centurion) , and twenty light tanks (Walker Bulldog M41)
.
Other major equipment includes approximately 650 M-113 and
M-116 Armored Personnel Carriers, 96 155mm self-propelled
9howitzers and over 270 other artillery. They also have the
Redeye air defense missile and the TOW anti-armor rocket.
The Air Force has 7600 men of which 1900 are
conscripts. There are six air stations and a total of six
flying squadrons with 116 aircraft. The squadrons are
broken down as follows: three fighter-bomber squadrons, one
with twenty F-35 XD Draken, one with twenty F-100 D/F and
one with twenty F-16; two air defense interceptor squadrons
each with twenty F-104G. In addition there are two support
squadrons, one with twenty RF-35 XD Draken, and one with
three C-47 and three C-130 transport aircraft. The Air
Force also has eight S-61 Sea King search and rescue
helicopters. There are still 34 F-16 A/B fighters and ten
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Gulfstream III transports on order. The Air Force
maintains two surface-to-air missile groups, one with "36
NIKE Hercules missiles and one with 24 improved HAWK. Both
groups are located in eastern Zealand.
Despite the fact that Denmark is surrounded on three
sides by ocean and has a seafaring history that goes back
over 1000 years to the days of the Vikings, its Navy is the
smallest of the three services. This appears discomforting
for a country that has a defense strategy built around
preventing an aggressor from attaining a foothold on Danish
territory rather than dislodging him once he is there.
Moreover, the most apparent threat to Denmark rests with the
considerable amphibious capability of the Warsaw Pact Navies
that will attack from the sea.
The Danish Navy has only 5700 regulars, of which
1400 are conscripts. The inventory of the Navy will,
according to the Defense Act of 1973, "comprise 52 actual
warships, some special purpose ships, and a number of
helicopters." The last four year Defense Act in 1981,
which covers the period from 1981 to 1985, calls for a
reduction in the fleet by 1985 to consist of 34 ships and
four helicopters for combat use, and 32 ships and eight
12helicopters for coast guard functions. Presently, the
Danes maintain five submarines, two frigates, three
corvettes, sixteen fast attack craft (FAC), and twelve mine
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warfare ships. There are also five fishery protection
patrol ships and 80 small patrol boats and craft in service
(see Appendix L).
The main naval procurement, which came out of the
1981 Defense Act, calls for construction of three submarines
of either German or Swedish design, and a modernization of
the two newest Type-205 class subs. Submarines are critical
in providing forward invasion defense and to counter foreign
submarines that may invade Danish waters. Several ships are
to be deleted by 1985 and, with the exception of the two
commissioned Delf iner-class submarines, no construction is
planned to replace them. They include: two Soloven-class
FAC, one coastal minelayer and two minesweepers. The two
Soloven-class will be used to supply spare parts for the
13four remaining ships of that class.
The Defense Act of 1981 failed to address the
subject of mine warfare. Aside from the completion of the
last Niels Juels class corvette in 1982, no other surface
craft capable of mine warfare were included.
Denmark's frigate/corvette force could be used to
support operations by smaller units in the Baltic, but more
probably will be needed to protect supply traffic coming in
from the West across the North Sea. The ships are con-
figured with Harpoon anti-missiles but only four recently
purchased Lynx helicopters are combat-equipped for
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over-the-horizon targeting. The remainder of the navy's
helicopter force is configured for fishery patrol.
The last capability which contributes to naval
defense and warrants some consideration is the extensive
system of gun and missile coastal defenses. Although, like
all fixed base weapons systems, they are vulnerable to
missile and aircraft strikes, they could make operations in
the Danish Straits risky if they were not pre-emptively
neutralized
.
The Minister of Defense controls the Danish Armed
Forces through the joint Defense Command, consistinig of the
Chief of Defense, the Chief of Defense Staff and the Chiefs
of the Services. The Minister of Defense may delegate
operational command to the Commander Operational Forces
Denmark (COFDEN) in a period of tension or when otherwise
deemed necessary. This will cover the time prior to
assignment of Danish Forces to NATO and facilitate national
allied coordination. COFDEN is identical with the Commander
Allied Forces Baltic Approaches (COMBALTAP)
.
The readily apparent problem with Denmark's defense
posture, as noted earlier, is the heavy reliance on their
capability to recognize the threat and react to it in time.
Both political and military leaders agree that there is a
possibility that a swift, unwarned and consequently
relatively light invasion of parts of eastern Denmark could
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grow out of Warsaw Pact maritime maneuvers in the vicinity
of Danish waters. The attractiveness of this scenario rests
on the assumption that the Soviets believe that their
conventional forces could achieve their objectives before
the necessary decisions to intervene, possibly using nuclear
weapons, could be made by NATO.
2. The Danish View of the Threat
The Danish government has in the past voiced strong
complaints against the Soviet Union for its apparent
willingness to ignore the sovereignty of Danish territorial
waters. In September 1979, in an effort to enforce new
guidelines for foreign warships, Denmark forced three Soviet
warships to leave Aalbeck Bay in the Skagerrak, where they
were monitoring the NATO exercise "Northern Wedding".
Foreign military vessels can anchor in Danish waters only
after obtaining special permission, or in case of
14
emergency.
Danish military leaders realize that it may be
perceived as worthwhile by the Warsaw Pact to attack Danish
territory, if they sense the presence of weak local forces
and political resolve. The Soviets might believe that such
an attack could well present an acceptable risk if objec-
tives could be quickly reached without the use of out of
area forces or nuclear weapons. Danish reliance on warning
indicators and the inherent delay in communications
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necessary to a NATO response may actually act in the Soviets
favor for a Baltic scenario.
NATO claims a readiness and ability to respond to
aggression anywhere in the Allilance. This ability is not
apparent in Denmark. If it is not apparent, it is not
providing a viable deterrent to aggression. A NATO response
after attack is not in keeping with the primary goal of
Danish defense strategy, which is to prevent the attack from
occurring. The present Danish defense posture may not be
capable of accomplishing that goal.
Military spending in Denmark dropped from 3.8
percent of GNP in 1953 to 2.6 percent in 1974. Only Canada
15
and Luxembourg contribued less. In 1978, Denmark
contributed 1,320 million dollars to NATO out of a total
NATO budget of 189,073 million, less than 1 percent. The
high level of social expenditures at a time of economic
problems competed heavily for defense dollars. The Danish
government claims that NATO has put great strains on Denmark
by its continual arms race. In 1978, a NATO summit agreed
on a three percent annual boost in members' defense spending
until 1984. Denmark has failed to mmet this agreement
repeatedly. This apparent unwillingness to contribute
toward defense has raised some contempt for Denmark in other
nations within the Alliance. Belgian, British, German and
American publications have used the word "Denmarkization" to
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describe a country willing to be protected by its allies,
but unwilling to pay its proper share. Still, the Danish
government in 1980 cut its military spending by 100 million
1
6
Kroner. This was even contrary to the Danish defense
agreement in 1977, which was intended to protect the defense
budget from cuts.
In August 1980, U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold
Brown sent a letter to his Danish colleague which warned
that the government's apparent decision not to increase
defense spending might endanger American possibilities of
coming to Danish assistance in times of war or crisis.
Contrary to apparent military opinion, there is
widespread agreement among Danish politicians that the
military threat to Denmark is insignificant at the moment.
The probability of a limited attack against the whole or
part of Danish territory or attempts at political
interference by the Warsaw Pact against the Danish
government are not perceived as a danger. The government
appears to subscribe to the belief that any conventional
conflict in Central Europe would automatically, and almost
instantaneously, escalate into tactical nuclear warfare.
They see little need for a strong conventional force and yet
are unwilling to adopt a nuclear policy. This view is
generally accepted and Danish political defense planners do
not see the need to worry about countering an all out
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attack in conjuction with a massive attack in Central
Europe. Even a more limited attack, they feel, would
trigger a nuclear response from NATO.
Denmark, like other Western European nations, wants
to ensure American involvement in any European conflict. In
December 1982, Danish Prime Minister Poul Schlueter's
center-right government suspended all Danish allocations for
NATO's planned deployment of 572 medium-range nuclear
18
missiles in Western Europe. Although this was reported to
be only a short term decision, many proponents of NATO
theater nuclear modernization see the decision as an indica-
tion that once again Denmark is unwilling to provide its
share toward NATO defense efforts.
Denmark has always preferred to rely on detente
rather than deterrence. Denmark was one of the first
Western countries to initiate a dialogue with the countries
of Eastern Europe, and the Danes are always quick to point
out the need for NATO to take a more active role in detente.
Even though strongly in favor of SALT and nuclear arms
reduction, Denmark still realizes that the security of
Northern Europe remains dependent upon a continued American
presence. Danes generally have no desire to see Western
Europe develop into a military superpower and are opposed




Denmark is faced with the same basic defense
problems she has faced since the end of World War II. Like
most nations, the Danish government is tasked with making
choices that provide the best security at the lowest cost.
Defense costs have increased at a rate higher than Western
inflation, and have caused military planners to evaluate
each threat and to consider all possible solutions, usually
selecting the one with the lower costs. Each nation's
perception of the threat will dictate where defense dollars
are spent. It is in this area of recognizing the threat and
responding to it that NATO and Danish policy makers
frequently disagree.
NATO continues to provide Denmark with a security
not equalled since the Danes controlled large portions of
Scandinavia in the 15th century. A broad consensus exists
between the major Danish political parties. This consensus
serves to maintain the continuity and stability of Danish
foreign and defense policy. I. B. Faurby of the University
of Aarhus concluded that, regardless of which party domi-
nated the ruling majority, they "do not differ fundamentally
20
over foreign and defense policy."
Denmark's position within the North Atlantic
Alliance will remain firm. However, favorable NATO rhetoric
does not resolve the problems of a weak defense capability.
Denmark's ability to secure the Danish Straits and hold
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strategic reinforcement locations until NATO can assist is
questionable. Present policies barring pre-positioning of
allied forces and equipment require reconsideration in the
face of such overwhelming odds favoring the Warsaw Pact's
Baltic forces.
It goes without saying that the defense of the
Baltic Approaches is more than a mere naval problem, and
that such initial defense depends heavily on joint
operations of land, air and naval forces from both Denmark
and the Federal Republic of Germany. In the aggregate,
however, the problems in the approaches are such that the
most immediate tasks to be solved are maritime in nature and
Denmark appears willing to allow a heavier share of the
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VI. WEST GERMANY'S NAVAL CONTRIBUTION
Germany, like Denmark, has attempted to capitalize on
the natural advantages that favor the defender in the Baltic
Approaches. It has gradually refined operational and
equipment requirements to best utilize these defenses. West
Germany and Denmark must nonetheless defend an extremely
vulnerable position.
Soviet strategy and previous Baltic exercises indicate a
phased employment of ground, air, and naval forces. In the
straits it calls for an offensive counter air and air
interdiction operation against both troops and infrastruc-
ture. Primary targets would be German and Danish airbases
and ports, and command and supply installations. These
attacks would likely be followed by airborne assault troops
to secure beaches, while at the same time, Pact naval forces
would penetrate the western Baltic and the Straits. This
would pave the way for the major advance of amphibious
assault forces.
The primary mission of West German maritime forces is to
counter this type of amphibious attack by meeting surface
combatants and support ships before they reach West German
waters. To accomplish this, the West German Navy adheres to
the NATO strategy of defense in depth. This strategy seems
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to offer the best opportunity to engage a numerically
superior enemy as far from German soil as possible by
repeated employment of friendly forces at times and places
chosen by the defender.
This defense- in-depth , or forward defense concept, is
designed to cause gradual and continual attrition to the
enemy while reducing allied vulnerability. This would be
accomplished by establishing a series of barriers that the
enemy would have to penetrate in order to reach his
objectives. The first barrier is made up of submarines and
fighter-bomber aircraft followed in turn by surface
combatants and then defensive minefields.
A. THE RIGHT TOOLS FOR THE JOB
The Bundesmar ine , established in May 1955, has developed
into a formidable arm of the Alliance. The West Germans
have built their navy around the requirements of three
specific regions of operations, each with its own special
mission (see Appendix M) . The first region is in the Baltic
east of the Danish island of Bornholm and well behind the
Warsaw Pact's front lines. The second area is the shallow
waters west of Bornholm close within the Danish islands and
the strategic straits. The last region lies outside the




West German forces in the region east of Bornholm must
be capable of operating with a minimum danger of detection
and yet still be capable of penetrating defenses and dis-
rupting enemy shipping. The West Germans have found that
the submarine is particularly suited for this type of
mission. Not only are submarines difficult to detect in the
shallow Baltic waters, but they require the enemy to commit
large numbers of forces for defense. West German submarines
are capable of mine-laying as well as anti-shipping mis-
sions. They could force the enemy to tie down considerable
mine countermeasures equipment close to his home port. This
could effectively limit the assets available for use in a
push through the straits. As an anti-shipping weapon, the
submarine could interdict enemy combatants and supply ships,
causing the enemy to use a greater number of ships in an
escort role and thereby reducing their availability for
offensive missions.
The West Germans have built more submarines since 1959
than any other country except the Soviet Union. Most have
been exported, but this is nonetheless an impressive
achievement. By the end of 1981, German shipyards had
received orders for over one hundred submarines. Of these,
fifty-two were designed and constructed for use within the
Baltic and North Seas. The most important classes are the
Type 205 and 206. The West German Navy has received a total
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of eighteen new 206 class and six new 205 class submarines
in the last few years. The Type 205 class submarine is
constructed by the Howaldt Deutsche Werke shipyard in Kiel.
This company joined the Rhunstahl-Thyssen-Nordseewerken
shipyard in Emden to build the Type 206. Both types of
submarines are homeported in Kiel. The Navy presently plans
2
to modernize the older Type 206 by the mid-1980s.
There is little doubt that the West Germans are capable
of designing a superior conventionally powered submarine.
The Danes contracted to build two Type 205 subs under German
license and the United States has considered a purchase of
3the new construction Type 206. The 206 is built with a
single pressure hull and is reported to be very maneuverable
and quiet. All equipment is shock mounted to reduce
internal noise and it can attain a submerged speed of 22
knots. The sub has a passive-active sonar system and eight
torpedo tubes capable of launching both wire-guided and
active-homing torpedoes. It requires only a twenty-two man
crew to operate and can effectively deploy over 400 statute
miles from its support facilities. From Kiel its opera-
tional range would include the Soviet Baltisk naval Base
operating area (home of the Soviet Naval Infantry in the




The 206 is ideally suited for the Baltic. In addition
to carrying up to 24 mines without having to reduce its
torpedo load, its small size, maneuverability and ability to




Besides the modernization of the 206, the Germans are
presently working on a Type 208, which is expected to be an
air- independent propulsion system. A fuel cell design
offers the most promise, the main problem being storage of
the chemical fuels in the submarine. Hydrogen, for
instance, could be carried in the form of a hydrocarbon
which could then be decomposed catalytically before use.
For short ranges the fuel cells could drive the electric
motors directly, but for longer ranges (10,000 km) a
propulsion installation with batteries would be required.
Construction of the Type 208 is expected in the 1990s.
In addition to submarines, naval fighter-bomber aircraft
equipped with anti-ship guided missiles could be effective
weapons in the eastern Baltic. In early July 1982, the
German Navy commenced conversion of Naval Air Wing 1 in
Jagel to the Tornado aircraft. Conversion is expected to be
completed by mid-1983. By 1987, the German fleet is
expected to have 112 Tornados.
The Tornado, because of its excellent low level high
speed characteristics, is expected to be able to penetrate
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enemy territory virtually undetected and engage surface
combatants and transport vessels with its superior combat
weaponry. Compared to its predecessor, the F-104G, the
Tornado greatly increases the operational capability in
terms of response time and combat effectiveness. It will
also be an effective partner to the new Danish F-16s.
The Tornado is a twin-engined two-seat supersonic
aircraft with a variable-geometry wing capable of all-
weather penetration. Like the F-104G, it will carry the
Kormoran anti-ship missile with a range of 22 nautical
miles. In addition to four Kormoran missiles, the Tornado
can carry the Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, bombs, machine
guns and active or passive ECM pods. Developed by a consor-
tium of British, West German, and Italian manufacturers, the
Tornado represents a major step toward standardizing NATO's
weaponry. Over all production for the three nations is
expected to reach 809 aircraft.
As previously stated, the most critical mission for the
German Navy lies in the narrow waters of the Western Baltic.
This region west of Bornholm requires yet another type of
force structure. Too shallow for effective submarine
warfare, and too restrictive for large surface vessels,
these waters call for small, swift and highly mobile
combatants. The ships must be able to rapidly concentrate
at continually changing locations as well as be able to
127

exploit geographical advantages in order to compensate for
the proximity, strength and flexibility of the enemy. To
accomplish this mission, the Germans have built an extensive
fleet of Fast Patrol Boats (FPB)
.
In December 1982, the first two of a new class called
the 143A joined the fleet. When the planned ten 143As are
completed, it will bring the German FPB fleet to some fifty
ships. There are presently twenty Type 148s and ten Type
143 missile boats in additoin to ten Type 142 torpedo boats
already in service. The new 143As, and eventually all
German FPBs, will be equipped with four MM38 Exocet missiles
for anti-shipping. In addition, they carry the 76mm 0T0-
Melara gun. Most will probably also receive the RAM anti-
ship missile defense system for air defense. This is the
same American-built system being installed on the new Type
122 frigates.
The introduction of an anti-ship-capable shore-based
combat helicopter is also under consideration. Because of
the short distances in the Baltic Approaches, the twenty
land-based Sea King search and rescue helicopters already in
service could be retrofitted to conduct anti-surface
operations. In an area of such high density shipping, the
helicopter could provide improved targeting information more
rapidly than surface craft and without having to approach
the enemy within a vulnerable range. They could also
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greatly expand the otherwise limited radar range of surface
ships to an over-the-hori zon capability, thus allowing full
utilization of the range of anti-ship missiles. There is
also some thought being given to mounting the Italian-built
Sea Killer, air-to-surface missile, on the Sea King. This
would provide the German Navy with an additional airborne
anti-ship capability.
Mining responsibilities in the Approaches are divided
between the Danish and German fleets (see Appendix N) . The
Danes have the area that includes the straits and north to
the Skagerrak. The German responsibility includes the
Fehmarn Belts and the eastern approaches to the straits.
The Danish and German navies would rely heavily on mines to
guard the entrance to the Little and Great Belts as well as
possible landing beaches along the German and Danish coasts.
These minefields would form the last element of an echeloned
maritime defense in the Baltic.
Mines can be effectively positioned by aircraft as well
as submarines and surface vessels. NATO presently has a
contingency plan which calls for the use of American B-52
bombers and carrier-based A-6 attack aircraft to support
mine laying operations in the Baltic Approaches. Such
aircraft are based far from the Baltic and may require hours
or days to reach the approaches and complete such an
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operation. The immediate minelaying duties will have to be
accomplished by the German and Danish forces.
The Fast Patrol Boat again lends itself to this mission.
The FPB possesses both the speed and weaponry to quickly
move into position and get minelaying operations started.
Almost all German naval combatants are capable of minelaying
but not all are suitable for operation in the straits.
Because of the confined nature of the approaches, minefields
can change the geography effectively and achieve a con-
siderable barrier effect when applied with circumspection
and in sufficient time. FPBs located in Flensburg and Kiel
are ideally situated to move immediately into the Fehmarn
Belt and begin sealing the straits.
It is estimated that it would take approximately twelve
hours to complete the mining of the German sector. This
time frame is based on the assumption that the ships are in
port at the time the order is given and that hostilities
have not begun. The German Navy feels confident that such
minelaying would be highly effective in sealing the Baltic
Approaches if timely political and military decisions were
made
.
Even though all German FPBs are capable of carrying six
to eight mines, there are usually none on board during
normal operations. Mines would have to be loaded at weapons
depots, transported to the piers and loaded aboard ships.
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All this would use up part of the critical twelve hour
estimate. If hostilities have already begun, this job"will
be even harder and more time-consuming. FPB commanders
would have to rely heavily on naval air to provide the
protection to enable them to complete minelaying operations.
If West German mines could be positioned in time, they
would represent a serious and costly obstacle to the Warsaw
Pact. This obstacle would provide NATO with valuable time
to mobilize and reinforce its Baltic allies. The costs to
the enemy in terms of men, equipment, and money to sweep
these mines would be considerably higher than NATO's cost of
minelaying
.
As a comparison, the estimated costs to the United
States for the highly successful minefields off the North
Vietnamese ports during the Vietnam War, was $6.5 million
while the cost of ensuring they were swept came to 314.5
in 8million
.
The building of a navy with ships capable of operating
in the North Sea appears to account for a considerable
portion of the German Navy' s defense commitment in the
future
.
In 1979, NATO made a decision designed to improve the
effectiveness of naval operations. The Tri-MNC Agreement on
Maritime Contingency Operations in the North Sea and
Adjacent Waters provided the foundation for improved NATO
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reaction and force concentration while reducing burdensome
9
coordination requirements. On June 19, 1980, West
Germany's Federal Security Council made the decision to lift
the self-imposed geographical restrictions on the German
Navy's area of operation, previously limited to the area
east of Calais and south of the 61st parallel. German naval
forces are now at the dispostiion of NATO for deployment
outside this area, if necessary. However, personnel levels
and the number and size of the ships have not been changed
as a result of this decision.
In the North Sea, West Germany now assumes some of the
load of other navies, such as the British and Dutch navies,
permitting them to concentrate on more important wartime
escort duties in other threatened areas of the North
Atlantic. West Germany has recognized that the Norwegian
coast is exposed to the threat of early amphibious assault
and seizure. At the same time, the battle for control of
the Norwegian Sea as the transit route for the Soviet
Northern Fleet into both the Altantic and North Sea could be
crucial for safeguarding the life line between America and
North Sea ports. West Germany understands that, without
access to reinforcements and supplies from the West, its
position in the Central Front will be untenable.
It is for these reasons that West Germany has seen the
need to expand its presence outside the Baltic. Six new
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Type 122 Bremen Class Frigates are presently on order. They
are designed for open ocean combat with a propulsion plant
capable of 30-plus knots and a range of 4000 nautical miles.
They carry the Harpoon anti-ship missile as well as both the
Seasparrow and the RAM-anti-ship missile defense systems.
The Bremen Class will also carry two Westland Sea Lynx ASW
helicopters equipped with dipping sonar and MK 46 active
homing torpedoes. This is the first time in history that
German ships will carry helicopters. The Navy is thinking
in terms of building only two Bremen Class Type 122s
initially, with the procurement of another four postposed
because of budgetary constraints until the 1990s.
The West German Navy intends to contribute significantly
to North Sea and Norwegian Sea operations. Destroyers,
helicopter-equipped frigates and Maritime Patrol Aircraft
will play an increased role in North Sea ASW operations,
escorting reinforcements, and, together with naval fighter-
bombers, engaging enemy forces. Apart from the naval
fighter-bombers which can operate in either the North Sea or
the Baltic, the West German Navy presently provides sixteen
ships of the destroyer, corvette and frigates type to North
Sea assignments.
These large ships have a rather limited role inside the
Baltic. However, the forces, both ships and aircraft, that
Germany has in the Baltic appear to be well suited to
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accomplish their mission. They constitute a modern, well-
equipped force that can assume their partnership with
Denmark in defending the straits and supporting an allied
maritime defense of the sea areas in the Northern Flank.
German naval forces account for approximately one-third of
the immediately available maritime assets in the region and
nearly three- four ths of NATO's maritime force in the
Baltic. 11
This commitment to their own national defense, as well
as the significant NATO contribution, demonstrates West
Germany's dedication to defending the Baltic Approaches and
its own littoral. With continued modernization and new
construction, combined with further integration of NATO
weapons systems, the West German Navy will remain a solid
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The complexities of defending the maritime approaches to
the Baltic could not be exhaustively explored in the limits
of this thesis. So much of NATO's ability to respond to any
threat depends on how that threat is perceived.
The Soviets have attempted to capitalize on every asset
in international relations to distort Western perception of
that threat. They have steadily strengthened treaty links
with Scandinavia through agreements such as the Helsinki
Final Act. They have attempted to demonstrate a desire for
detente and nuclear arms reductions with their Nuclear Free
Zone proposals, including their support for the Scandinavian
sponsored Peace March in 1982. At each opportunity the
Soviets have cleverly appealed to Scandinavian fears of war
and hopes for world peace, while playing down their own role
in arms escalation and attempting to place the blame for the
arms race on the West.
In the area of international trade, the Soviets have
multiplied Scandinavian reliance on Soviet raw materials and
fuel energy while attempting to gain greater access to
Western technology and capital. With its COMECON partners




The most visible and the most ominous way in which the
Soviets have attempted to influence Nordic defense decisions
is through the use of their military forces. Far out of
proportion to any opposing forces, this clarion manifesta-
tion of policy should come as no surprise to the student of
Soviet foreign relations:
"This intimate link between the armed forces and
foreign policy was characteristic of Lenin's outlook
from the start, since Lenin, who greatly admired
Clausewitz, drew no firm distinction between war and
politics, and whose specific contribution to twentieth
century foreign policy was its militarization."
Recent incidents such as the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, the continual unrest in Poland, and the
frequent incursions of Soviet submarines into Swedish and
Norwegian territorial waters have contributed toward keeping
Soviet power in a proper perspective. However, how NATO's
Baltic allies may respond in the future to this increasing
Soviet maritime strength and presence depends directly on
how Scandinavians perceive Soviet foreign policy goals in
that region. If Soviet intentions are thought to be
innocuous or benign, Soviet activity will be tolerated.
The alarming strength of Soviet armed forces in the
waters and on the borders of the Baltic and its approaches
poses an overwhelming threat to Scandinavian security.
Nations with limited resources and close, exposed geographic
positions, may view the task of countering such enormous
power as beyond their capability and therefore hopeless.
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It is the task of each nation within NATO to remain
committed to the common defense goals upon which NATO was
founded. It is only through this mutual determination and
cooperation that the alliance can continue to present a
united deterrent so capable that the risk of conflict
remains unacceptable to the Kremlin leadership.
So far Soviet pressures applied to Scandinavia have been
limited to verbal appeals and threats to Norway and Denmark
for renunciation of the NATO alliance and a return to the
isolated neutrality that failed so terribly in World War II.
However, if the risks to the Soviet Union in a Baltic
expansion are ever perceived as acceptable due to NATO
disunity or the absense of political will and military
capability, then the Baltic could easily be swallowed by the
Russian "Bear" .
The Soviet strategy of pre-empting a supposed NATO
strike may be considered too risky by the Kremlin leader-
ship, if conducted on the Central Front. However, pre-
emption at sea and within the confines of the Baltic could
well be feasible. The Soviet-led forces in the Baltic
already constitute a considerable capability. It can be
argued that this capability indicates a Soviet commitment
far in excess of that normally attributed to a flank area.
The Baltic and its approaches represent a major component of
Soviet strategy against Western Europe. The Soviets
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plan the full coordination of the Baltic-based and northern
strike forces, with the Baltic becoming the staging area
from which Soviet naval air and seapower can strike out far
from Soviet shores.
Admiral Gorshkov made Soviet naval strategy clear in
1963, when he stated that the Soviet Navy needed to be
restructured in order to counter the seaborne components of
the United States strategic arsenal as far from Soviet soil
as possible. The Danish peninsula could provide the forward
bases from which this goal could be accomplished and
domination of the Baltic supply routes would ensure the
2
sustainability of those forward bases.
Every major Soviet naval exercise since 1968 has
utilized the Baltic Fleet in a significant role and has
generally assumed that access to and from the Baltic would
be unobstructed. OKEAN 1975, one of the larger Soviet naval
exercises, demonstrated a number of firsts for naval
operations. Significant from a Baltic perspective was the
presence of more than one hundred ships involved in the
Baltic and North Sea and the fact that Soviet naval units
operated for the first time in the Bay of Lubeck. Before
OKEAN 1975, the Soviet command had not previously dispatched
such large numbers of units from the Baltic into the
Atlantic. Units of the Baltic Fleet will play an important
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role in reinforcing Soviet naval forces in the Atlantic in
an operational emergency.
In the event of an actual attack by Warsaw Pact forces,
if the Baltic Fleet is to assume its practiced position in
the North Sea as well as the Baltic, the Danish Straits must
be one of the first NATO defenses attacked.
This is the first of several conclusions derived from
this research. A second conclusion is that NATO does not
have sufficient numbers of forces in place to defend the
approaches in the face of a numerically superior Warsaw Pact
advance; third, that if the Warsaw Pact were successful in
gaining control of the Baltic Approaches, the Soviet Baltic
Fleet would play a significant role in any conventional
battle for the North Sea and Atlantic. The presence of
these naval units outside the Baltic would have a negative
impact on British security as well. Control of the
approaches would also allow the use of Jutland as a staging
area for attacks north into Norway, south into the Federal
Republic of Germany and west against the British Isles.
A final conclusion is that such an attack would be in
keeping with historical Soviet security interests. An
attack against the Baltic Approaches would be deeply rooted
in the same Soviet defensive mentality and a feeling of
insecurity that resulted in Soviet annexation of Latvia,
Lithuania, Estonia and large portions of Finland and
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Germany. The problem of defending the industrial complex of
Leningrad and further on, the heart of Russian, is still a
critical consideration for Soviet defense planners. It if
hard to envision a far reaching attack by Soviet forces
against the West preceeding very far without the securing of
any approaches to Leningrad or the Soviet Union's Baltic
coast. Soviet warfighting strategy demands that the battle
be driven forward on into the enemy's territory at the
earliest stage of conflict in order to protect Russian soil.
This goal can only be assured if the Baltic and its
approaches are under Soviet control.
B. NATO OPTIONS
What can NATO do to regain the regional balance in the
Baltic? NATO must pursue two aims at once in order to
present a unified deterrent strong enough to discourage
Soviet advances in Scandinavia. One aim leads to a military
capability that can counter the Warsaw Pact's numerical
superiority, not necessarily numerical equality but a level
that would ensure that the risk of any attack is too high
when compared to the expected gains. The second aim is a
political road. To travel this road would require strong,
dedicated and responsible political leadership. Political
leaders should look beyond party gamesmanship and lead the
Nordic countries in maintaining a credible defense posture.
The public must be provided easy access to the facts in
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order to see the threat for themselves. It is impossible to
expect the voters in a democratic society to support costly,
but necessary, defense programs if they cannot see the
purpose or requirement for such programs. NATO tends to
neglect public information and what information is available
is not sufficiently disseminated to people unfamiliar with
NATO bureaucratic procedures.
In light of the current economic and political
restraints inherent in the Baltic and in consideration of
the various individual national security interests, NATO
could pursue three viable military options in order to
regain a portion of the Baltic regional balance and enhance
the security of the Baltic Approaches. The first option
centers around the need for improved air power to counter
Soviet numerical superiority in aircraft; the second option
supports the construction of a naval task force dedicated to
the Baltic; and the third would increase the capability of
NATO to quickly and effectively mine the Baltic Approaches.
1. Air Superiority
Responding to the air threat in the Baltic region
would require NATO to increase its own air capability in
that region. It seems economically unlikely that Denmark or
Norway would significantly increase their air forces beyond
current levels. Therefore an examination of the traditional
reliance of the Baltic nations on the self-regulating
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effects of the Nordic Balance is imperative. The "Balance"
part of the concept no longer exists. It has already
shifted dramatically in favor of the Warsaw Pact forces.
The Danes and Norwegians should take political steps to
strengthen their contribution to the alliance and to help
counteract the decline in NATO power. They should recognize
that only through the pre-positioning of allied aircraft,
surface-to-air missiles (SAMS) and other warfighting
equipment can they hope to ensure a robust deterrent and
defense posture. Unfortunately, this solution is unlikely
to succeed in the present political climate.
One significant step toward countering the air
threat was the decision by Danish, Norwegian, Belgian and
Dutch defense planners, to purchase the USAF fighter-
interceptor, the F-16. As these aircraft slowly enter into
their respective forces, Northern Flank air defenses will be
greatly improved. However, many of Norway's assets will
still be needed in the Finnmark region and provide no
additional contribution to the Baltic Approaches. Even with
these new aircraft, additional reinforcement of Denmark and
Southern Norway with allied fighter aircraft plus additional
SAM implacements is necessary to raise losses of Soviet
bombers to an unacceptable level. Additionally, it is
unclear whether current airfields and support assets are
even capable of accepting such reinforcements. Presently,
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NATO does not have reasonably assured access to airfields in
either Denmark or Norway because of the current basing
policies of those nations. Both countries appear unwilling
to permit allied assistance in peacetime, yet because of
political and economic restraints are unable to provide
adequate airfield support or operating facilities.
Warsaw Pact exercises seem to indicate that they
desire to eliminate any allied air capability quickly in the
first stage of conflict, by attacking the airbases and
associated communications and supplies. Shortages in
support facilities in peacetime would become even more acute
after the first Soviet strike had begun.
Although the actual number of completed Collocated
Operating Bases (COBs) in Europe is classified, it is
generally acknowledged that the number is below that
required to accommodate all U.S. Air Force F-15 and F-16
fighters that could be employed in the defense of Europe, to
say nothing of carrier-based, British and other allied
3
reinforcements. in addition, Denmark and Norway are also
expected to accommodate Marine air-ground task forces
(MAGTF) and their air wings, that would likely be assigned
in wartime.
The COB problem is not new to NATO, and improvements
are being made. However, for nations such as Denmark and





and rely heavily on reinforcements, it is critical that
sufficient air facilities be available at a moment's notice.
Land-based NATO air reinforcements could free up
national units to counter Warsaw Pact aircraft and provide
protection for the eastern flank of allied forces attempting
to reinforce Baltic defenses. If such aircraft were pre-
positioned, NATO's critical warning time could be reduced
and Soviet military planners would be faced with new
compl ications
.
Like all military planners, the Soviets face the
problem of aircraft allocations among theaters. They must
carefully calculate the losses they expect as a result of
such air strikes. Any action NATO could take in this
period, when they are essentially "outgunned" on all fronts,
to increase those losses and therefore heighten the risk of
success, would enhance deterrence and work to NATO's
advantage
.
2. A NATO Baltic Fleet
A second option worthy of consideration, particul-
arly in light of the fact that as mentioned earlier, Danish
and Norwegian basing restrictions are not likely to change,
would be to increase the NATO naval presence in the Baltic
Sea. Considering the time and distance factors that inhibit
rapid allied reinforcement, it would seem prudent to
permanently deploy forces to counter Soviet pre-emptive
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plans in the area. A small, modern task force equipped with
Harpoon and Tomahawk missile systems would significantly
augment NATO power in the Baltic.
These forces might be in the form of Standing NATO
Naval Forces for the Baltic and Norwegian Seas. The concept
would be similar to the existing commands of NATO's Standing
Naval Force Atlantic and Standing Naval Force Channel. In
the Baltic such a force could consist of U.S., Danish,
Norwegian and West German ships, the primary difference
between this force and a naval force such as Standing Naval
Force Atlantic, is that, although individual ships would
rotate, the force would remain in the Baltic Sea. Also,
instead of being composed of a handful of destroyers and
frigates, it should be composed of ships uniquely suited for
Baltic operations, missile equipped strike hydrofoils
(SHMs)
.
With the development of the Tomahawk cruise missile,
and the capability to hit targets 600-900 miles away, such a
force would not only be cost effective to a degree that
would allow all Baltic allies to contribute, but it would
turn the patrol gunboat of the past into an extremely viable
naval weapons platform. The goal would not be to replace
the larger ships, but to build a new force within the NATO
alliance that is capable of tilting the Baltic balance





This concept, recently outlined by Commander Miles
A. Libbey III, U.S. Navy and based upon the now proven
capabilities of the land-attack version of the Tomahawk
4(TLAM) , is worthy of serious consideration by NATO.
In the past, the U.S. Navy has not been interested
by small combatants. Such negative features as short-range
weapons, "no legs", and "easy targets" are frequently cited.
Also, with the end of the Vietnam War, the U.S. Navy lost
its mission requirement for small patrol boats. However,
this mission is certainly present in the Baltic, where Fast
Patrol Boats (FPBs) provide the majority of Baltic Naval
defenses
.
The Baltic consists of relatively protected waters,
where distances are short and the sea is close to numerous
lucrative targets. A TLAM force there could offset the NATO
shortage of tactical air, provide support to the battle on
the Central Front and act as a naval tripwire in the north.
Because the Baltic threats from aircraft, ships, missiles
and submarines are great, maneuverability, speed and a small
radar profile are premium design qualities. These qualities
all contribute to the survivability of the ship. Speed and
maneuverability help dilute the enemy's targeting efforts.
The ability to go faster than 33 knots (normal surface ship
speed) is therefore critical. The small radar signature
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allows the SHM to blend in with high density merchant and
c.
fishing traffic or hide close to land masses.
The "missing link", as Commander Libbey refers to
it, is not the American Pegasus-class hydrofoil missile ship
(PHM) . He proposes a ship of similar design, but larger and
better-equipped. Because of the rough seas in the Baltic
and the effects on crew fatigue and ship maintenance, the
ships would have to operate on cycled patrols of only a few
days each. A force of 30 SHMs would be preferred in order
to allow a three cycle rotation in which ten ships could
remain at sea at any one time. If the ships carried two
Harpoons (or other NATO surface-to-surface missile) and six
TLAM-Cs (conventional warheads) and ten ships were always on
station, that would bring 60 non-nuclear NATO missiles to
bear against Eastern military sites. If such a force was
also developed for the Black Sea, it would place 120
missiles at NATO's disposal for a first response against
prime military and industrial targets (see Appendix 0).
From the international waters in the Baltic four out
of five primary northern Soviet airfields can be reached:
Pechenga , Belusha-Guba , Severomorsk and the Northern Fleet
Headquarters at Murmansk. There are estimated to be over 40
airfields on the Kola Peninsula and more than 700 aircraft.
These forces are expected to play a significant role in the
North Atlantic Sea battle. On the Baltic coast three
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airfields near Riga, Baltysk and Kaliningrad are vulnerable
to Tomahawk attack.
The ability of an SHM force to respond quickly to a
Warsaw Pact attack, their capability to survive a first
assault, and the extreme accuracy of the TLAM-C would cause
the Soviets to rethink their game plan for naval warfare in
Europe. This force would demonstrate a renewed NATO and
U.S. commitment to the Baltic in which all regional partners
could participate. The bond that would be formed between
the U.S. Navy and other NATO navies through the sharing of
the TLAM-C and the joint operations that would follow, would
demonstrate increased NATO unity and go far toward healing
wounds within the alliance. And last, but certainly not the
least important, is the significant increase in NATO's
ability to immediately respond to Soviet aggression in the
Baltic and destroy important second and third echelon sites
in war. Such a capability would present a credible Baltic
Naval deterrent and would go far in preserving peace and
stability in the region.
3 . Aerial Minelaying
The third option to explore is extremely critical to
the Baltic. It has to do with effective and timely deploy-
ment of NATO's mine assets within the Baltic Approaches.
Warning time could be extremely limited. As noted earlier,
NATO relies heavily on the use of mines to secure the
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approaches in wartime. Therefore, it is imperative that
NATO have a capability of responding to the mining mission
in a more timely manner. NATO's current ability to seal the
Baltic is questionable.
Aside from traditional means of mine deployment via
surface ships and submarines, aerial mining has been
gimployed effectively in the Baltic since 1916. However,
aerial mining capability will rely on the realization of the
first option, that of being able to maintain air superiority
at least in the early stages of conflict.
Although aerial minelaying was extremely effective
in the Second World War and the North Sea mines accounted
for 85 percent of the total number of enemy ships which were
mine victims (1347 enemy ships sunk or damaged) , NATO pre-
9
sently has extremely limited aerial minelaying capability.
There is none within the Baltic region. NATO's Baltic mine
warfare surface ships can be described as too old or too
few.
Based on the U.S. Navy's successful experience in
aerial minelaying in Haiphong harbor, the United States has
taken the lead in the alliance on aerial minelaying
techniques. A number of U.S. conventional combat aircraft
are capable of undertaking mining operations. The Navy's
P-3C Orion can carry between four and ten mines depending on
their type (Norway flies the same aircraft) . If available,
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B-52DS can be equipped to carry all U.S. air-laid underwater
mines, which could vary in quantity from 84 500 lb.
Destructor mines to a typical load of 18 Captors.
Carrier-based A-6Es and A-7Es can also carry small numbers
of the heavier mines, but would require a large number of
sorties to complete extensive mining operations.
All these aircraft, with the exception of the
Norwegian P-3C, are located great distances from the Baltic
Approaches. Because of many demands and limited resources,
it would be extremely shortsighted to expect a nation such
as Denmark to devote a large portion of its defense budget
toward sophisticated mine-capable aircraft. However, with
the development of a Cargo Aircraft Minelaying System
(CAMLS) this capability may be within their grasp.
Built by Lockheed-Georgia Company, the system is
designed to be fitted into the C-130H (there are three in
Danish service), C-141A and the C-5A. The smaller aircraft
could carry around twenty Captor size mines and around 80
for the larger aircraft. The system is designed for rapid
installation and removal and could likely be modified to fit
other existing military and commercial cargo aircraft. It
is a self-contained system with the mines on standard
aircraft pallets for ease of handling. The mines are
delivered from the ramp of the aircraft by an ejector module
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operated by a single loadmaster and provides fully automatic
or manual control of the entire launch procedure.
CAMLS provides a relatively cheap but high volume
delivery capability that allows for rapid defensive
minefield implacement . When combined with navigational
systems such as the new Ground Position Satellite system,
navigation inaccuracy can be minimal even in severe Baltic
weather. With U.S. cooperation, CAMLS is a system within
the reach of NATO allies and would greatly improve NATO's
Baltic defensive minelaying capability. It may provide the
speed necessary to close the Baltic within the limited
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VI 1 1 . CONCLUSION
Until the early 1970s, NATO could accept regional
inferiority in land forces in the Baltic littoral as long as
allied naval forces in the North Atlantic and Norwegian Sea
remained unchallenged. The 1970s witnessed a significant
growth in Soviet naval power, while at the same time NATO's
maritime forces were reduced. The Soviet Baltic Fleet has
steadily specialized and modernized its capabilities to meet
the demands of narrow sea operations. Warsaw Pact exercises
have demonstrated a well practiced ability for amphibious
assault, ready to support the flank of advancing ground
operations and secure the Baltic Approaches. Whether such a
Warsaw Pact seizure would be designed to allow Soviet Baltic
combatants to pass unhindered in support of the Northern
Fleet, or merely intended to allow the Baltic to be sealed
from a possible NATO advance toward Leningrad, is relatively
unimportant. Either purpose would place the control of the
Northern Flank in Soviet hands and effectively split NATO in
two, directly affecting the Central Front and isolating the
Northern Flank.
The threat confronting the North Atlantic alliance in
the Baltic region is formidable, in both conventional and
nuclear terms; but the threat is by no means beyond the
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capability of the alliance to continue to deter. Soviet
eagerness to avoid the risks of a quick nuclear escalation
in the Central region might well lead them to take an
indirect approach around the European perimeter. It is the
forward sea areas such as the Baltic that will be the first
to respond to any encroachment.
If NATO is to raise the level of regional deterrence in
the Baltic, it must first raise the consciousness of the
political leadership of the Baltic allies regarding the
threat. Any change in the regional balance is ultimately
dependent on political decisions. In the face of expanding
Soviet military power in Europe, it is NATO's unity, resolve
and the dedication to use the resources and power at its
disposal, should it become necessary, that can hold Soviet
expansion in balance.
In the Baltic, there is a commanding case for looking
anew at pre-positioning , including both men and equipment.
With the current level of technology, modern warfare
proceeds very quickly and allows little time for mobili-
zation. The "expeditionary philosophy" of reinforcement
from afar no longer has the degree of military or political
utility that is possessed a few years ago.
Close ranges in the Baltic make NATO targets extremely
vulnerable to a first strike air attack. Political and
economic considerations do not permit Norway, Denmark or
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even West Germany to significantly expand their air forces.
Pre-posi tioned air assets would permit sufficiently rapid
mobilization and the defensive mining of the approaches and
would as well assist in protecting airfields necessary to
allied reinforcements.
The alliance must rid itself of the idea that any
defensive or preparatory response to Soviet expansion is, in
itself, perceived as a provocation by the Kremlin. Allied
defenses that are perceived to be weak can constitute
invitations to aggression.
Because of the political sensitivity involved with
increasing Western presence in the form of troops stationed
ashore, NATO should consider expanding its maritime position
in the Baltic. Such an expansion could take the form of a
NATO Baltic Sea Fleet equipped with modern conventional
warhead missile systems and able to respond immediately to a
Warsaw Pact advance. A force designed to operate in the
Baltic Sea environment would pose an obstacle to Soviet
maritime armed coercion and serve to solidify NATO's commit-
ment to Baltic security. United States participation in
such a force would offer the NATO European allies a
convincing and reassuring offset to the influential presence
of Soviet power at their doorsteps.
The United States, as a leader of the alliance, should
push for the expansion of NATO's minelaying capability in
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the Baltic. The defense of the Baltic Approaches relies
heavily on timely implacement of defensive minefields. The
U.S. is able to provide aerial minelaying technology that
can convert present cargo aircraft assets for an aerial
minelaying mission. The Cargo Aircraft Minelaying System is
an "off the shelf" capability that would greatly accelerate
Baltic minelaying.
The security requirements of the North Atlantic alliance
have not changed since the alliance was formed. It's
deterrent strength lies in the paradox that only from a
position of power and the clear ability to inflict damage on
an aggressor beyond a level he is willing to accept, can
basic national interests and stability be at least nominally
assured. The nations directly involved in maintaining the
freedom of the Baltic and its approaches represent only a
small portion of the alliance membership. However, the
policies and attitudes projected within this region reflect







































APPENDIX D: THE BALTIC APPROACHES: CHARACTERISTICS
AND RESTRICTIONS
The geography of the Danish Straits is confining and
offers a perfect military checkpoint. Three avenues of
shipping exist from west to east as follows:
1. LITTLE BELT : 30 miles long, 1/2 to 20 miles wide,
50 feet deep minimum
2. GREAT BELT : 44 miles long, 10 miles wide, 42 to
215 feet deep
3. ORESUND : 87 miles long, 2 1/2 to 17 miles wide,
deeper than the other straits but does
have shoals of 23 feet
Denmark controls transit through these straits by virtue
of The Treaty of Copenhagen, 1857. After 1951, a Royal
Danish Edict allowed warships in the straits in peacetime
under certain conditions:
LITTLE BELT : Diplomatic notice 8 days in advance
GREAT BELT : Free passage except for warships in
the strait for over 48 hours, then 8
days notice necessary. Permission
necessary if more than 3 warships of
the same nationality use the straits
at the same time or if the stay
exceeds 4 days.
ORESUND : Same restrictions as Great Belt except
(The Sound) 8 days diplomatic notice necessary if
transitting Copenhagen Roads--free
passage through the Swedish side if
the vessel does not stop or anchor.
(Sweden controls half of Oresund.)
Submarines must transit all three straits surfaced.
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APPENDIX F: POLISH NAVAL FORCE LEVELS
NAVY: 22,500 (6,000 conscripts)
.
4 W-class submarines.
1 Kotlin destroyer with two Goa SAM.
13 Osa FAC(M) with Styx SSM.
17 FAC(T): 4 Pilica , 10 Wisla , 3 P-6.
23 large patrol craft: 13 Obluze , 1 Oksywie , 9 Gdansk (some
coastguard)
.
23 ocean minesweepers: 12 Krogulec , 11 T-43.
25 K-8 minesweeping boats.
23 amphibious ships: 8 Polnocny LCT, 4 Marabut LCM,
15 Eichstaden LCA.
3 intelligence vessels (AGI) : 1 B-10, 2 Moma .
1 Naval Aviation Div (52 combat aircraft)
:
1 attack regt: 3 sqns with 42 MiG-17.
1 recce sqn with 10 11-28.
1 hel regt: 2 sqns with 25 Mi-2/-4/-8.
SSM: Styx/Samlet
Bases: Gydnia, Hel, Swinoujscie, Kolobrzeg, Ustka.
Source: The Military Balance 1981-82
,
(London: Interna-




APPENDIX G: GDR NAVAL FORCE LEVELS
Navy: 16,000 (10,000 conscripts).
3 sqns.
2 Rostock frigates (ex-Sov Koni )
.
1 Koralle corvette (more building)
.
12 Hai large patrol craft.
15 Osa-1 FAC(M) with Styx SSM.
49 FAC(T): 18 Shershen , 31 Libelle .
50 coastal minesweepers: 14 Kondor -I , 36-11.
12 Frosch LST.
2 Kondor-I intelligence collection vessels (AGI)
8 supply ships and tankers, incl. 2 modified Frosch It tpts
1 hel sqn with 8 Mi-4, 5 Mi-8.
Coastal Frontier Brigade (3,000): 12 inf, arty bns
,
8 boat sqns; 18 vessels, 152mm guns, Samlet SSM.
Bases: Peenemunde, Rostock/Warnemunde , Sassnitz, Wolgast,
Tarnewi tz.
Reserves: 25,000
Source: The Military Balance 1981-82
,
(London: Interna-













Principal surface combatants 2
Patrol combatants 12
Amphibious warfare ships 12
Mine warfare ships
Mine warfare craft 33
Coastal patrol river/
roadstead craft 82
Underway replenishment ships 4
Material support ships














Total ships 175 141 about 545
Naval aircraft 52/25* 260
Naval personnel strengths 16,000 22,500 105,000
* Helicopters
- The 120 patrol combatants in the Soviet Navy are dispersed
variously between the four fleets and the Caspian Sea
flotilla.
# Sixty of the 86 Soviet Amphibious warfare ships are
smaller MP-4 and Polnochny classes. These are distributed
variously between the fleets
.
Source: The Military Balance 1981-82
,
(London: Interna-
tional Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982).
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APPENDIX J: BALTIC SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF BOUNDARY CLAIMS
F i n I and
L^>-V^ / r Aland •.?**>% , xV^^. )
%» v jrftf&f y •;?*3Lar Helsinki ,*4**' /
w e d e n
1 1 Disputed area
Limit of Soviet claim






APPENDIX K: FINNISH NAVAL FORCE LEVELS
Navy: 2,500 (1,900 conscripts).
1 ex-Sov Riga frigate.
2 Turunmaa corvettes.
5 FAC(M) with MTO ( Styx ) SSM: 4 ex-Sov Osa -II, 1 Isku
11 Nuoli FAC(G)
.
5 large patrol craft: 3 Ruissalo , 2 Rihtniemi .
3 minelayers, 6 Kuha inshore minesweepers.
1 HQ/log/trg ship (minelayer)
.
14 small LCU/tpts, 8 utility/spt ships.
(On Order: 8 Tstv (PB-80) FAC , 5 log ships.)
Bases: Uppiniemi (Helsinki), Turku.
Source: The Military Balance 1981-82
,
(London: Interna-




APPENDIX L: DANISH NAVAL FORCE LEVELS
Navy: 5,700 (1,400 conscripts).
6 submarines: 2 Narhvalen , 4 Pelf inen (1 to retire in 1981).
5 frigates with 8 Harpoon SSM, Sea Sparrow SAM:
2 Peder Skram , 3 Niels Juel .
5 Hvidbjornen fishery-protection frigates, each with 1 hel
.
10 Willemoes FAC (M) with Harpoon SSM.
6 Soloven FAC (T) (some in reserve).
22 large patrol craft: 8 Daphne , 3 Agdleq , 2 Maagen ,
9 Bar so .
23 coastal patrol craft.
7 minelayers: 4 Falster , 2 Lindormen , 2 Langeland (to retire
1983).
6 ex-U.S. Type 60 coastal minesweepers.
Coastal defence unit:
8 Alouette III, 7 Lynx hel.
(On order: 4 Type 210 submarines, 15 Harpoon SSM, Sea
Sparrow SAM , 1 Lynx he 1
.
)
Bases: Copenhagen, Korsor, Freder ikshavn
.
Reserves: 4,000; Navy Home Guard 4,900. 20 coastal patrol
craft
.
Source: The Military Balance 1981-82
,
(London: International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982), p. 31.
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APPENDIX M: WEST GERMAN NAVAL FORCE LEVELS
Manpower : 36,500; and about 4,800 officer; (11,000
conscripts) includes Naval Air arm.
Reserves : 25,000
Conscripts service period: 15 months
FLEET:
Destroyers : 3 modified Adams class DDG (with Tartar
missiles)
4 Hamburg class (with Exocet missile)





6 F122 frigates ordered by the West
German Navy are armed with Raytheon Sea
Sparrow point-defense missiles, McDonnel
Douglas Harpoon anti-ship weapons and







1 Hans Burkner A 1449
5 Thetis class
18 new construction Type 206
6 Type 205
2 Type 206
1 converted Type XXI
The Type 208 is being constructed and
will be ready in the 1990s. 6 new
submarines of Class 210, with a
displacement of 750 tons, are under
consideration in the next few years.
10 Type 153 A (with Exocet MM 38
missile) under construction
10 Type 142 (with Exocet MM 38 missile)
10 Zobel class (with torpedoes)









There are plans to obtain 10 Type 162







SAMs : Roland II, Seacat
AAMs : Sidewinder
A new class of minehunters, Type 342,
is planned. The Navy hopes to receive
three complete Md.86 naval gunfire
systems. Also Class 143 FAC scheduled
to be procured. Various miscellaneous
service and regular ships, launches,
tugs, icebreakers, survey ships,
auxiliary ships, coast guard vessels,
etc
.
Naval aviation 112 combat aircraft
3 attack sqns with 66 F-104G
1 recce sqn with 27 RF-104G
2 MR sqns with 14 Atlantic, 5 ELINT
Altantic
1 SAR Hel sqn with 21 Sea King Mk 41
1 utility sqn with 20 Do-28-2 ac
.
Trg: 9 TF-104F
ASM: AS-20, AS-30, AS-34 Kormoran
On Order
Major naval bases :
15 Lockheek S-3A Vikings, 112 Tornado





Source: Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook
,
(Washington
D.C.: Copley and Associates, S.A., 1982).
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APPENDIX 0: RANGE OF THE TOMAHAWK CRUISE MISSILE FROM
BALTIC SEA AND BLACK SEA POSITIONS
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APPENDIX P: SOVIET BALTIC SEA FLEET DEPLOYMENTS





















(A, V, E & N)
Submarines
(SS)
(T, B f F, R,
Q, Z & W) 63 74 34
TOTAL 69 76 44
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Kynda ) 2 2
Light cruisers
CL ( Sverdlov ,
Chapaev ) 4 5 2
Guided missile destroyers
DDG (Kashin , Kilden ,
Kanin , Kr ivak , Kotlin
(SAM) Krupny ) 7 14 4
Destroyers
DD ( Kotlin / Tallinn ,
Skory ) . 15 14 15
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